- ¥ \ ) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION WATERGATE (SUMMARY) PART 1 of 2 FILE NUMBER : 139-4089 t Vrw>4*l K>1 * HO. >Q *uy mi tofrtdh MC HO. 17 UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT M emorandum Assoc, Dir. D«p. AD Kim. As*r. Dir.; Ajtfmin. HE DiKEUTUK 0. T.vJACOBSON DATE: 7/5/74 SUBJECT off o Comp. S yi t. k.. k a u ATTatrt f!l*« A Cm. _ C*o, Wit, Ay fL- ( / y- >/, A //« 1 ' i ^JVATERGATE INVESTIGATJOK-^ j^gE, ANALYSIS 7ct* 7 Jilts' Pursuant to the Director’s instructions on 5/14/74 for the Office of Planning and Evaluation (OPE) to conduct a complete analysis of the FBI’s conduct of the Watergate and related investigations the enclosed study has been prepared. The General Investigative Division participated in major portions of this study. ■nmp Ltfdj C*m, Tflaifim Rb. _ Dir«CtM W* • — Jt JL 1 • m view oi me immense scope of the Watergate investigations, it was necessary for OPE to narrow the focus of this analysis to those areas of the investigations which have caused critical commentary relating to the Bureau’s performance. Therefore, the OPE staff undertook a review of selected materials which provided a comprehensive cross section of commentary regarding these investigations. The materials reviewed included ’’White House Transcripts", proceedings of the Senate Watergate Committee; confirmation testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee AM i-l* A M AMA'IM Am /V-f T aIf »f Til 4 -A Vl A L 1 LIT Tvi Al* Ki' A t *1 T Ull Uic uuuiiiidiiuu ui Li. rau iuiv kjl ay m tu uc rui cvwt > utui u * Silbert to be U. S. Attorney for the District of Columbia, and William D. Ruckelshaus to be Deputy Attorney General. Numerous books and articles relating to the Watergate matters were also reviewed. In addition, Inspection reports, summary memoranda, and selected file materials were reviewed and analyzed as to content. Enclosure''"'" RK-W * iu 4 • vaiiauaa r - . j jy 1 - Mr. Adams (Enel.) . 1 - Mr. Gebhardt (Enel, jCt/T* 1 - Mr. Jacobson ' f ' 1 - Mr. Sheets 1 - Mr. Revell (8^ OBR/imt / 1 in\ * A 1 \*/ / y •/ j / : -Q77 HE JUL 23 1974 rAMTTxmrn _ nvi?p Wil All VUV - V v AJJl* 6 7 JUL 24 1974 (. e-vclosure IX iuu „„ 1H873JEH ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1 1 1 il ?0 Memorandum to The Director RE: WATERGATE INVESTIGATION - OPE ANALYSIS After the conclusion of this review process OPE was able to define fifteen general areas of criticism which encompassed essentially the entire range of responsible public commentary on the Bureau T s involvement in the Watergate matters. These fifteen areas of criticism are as follows: ± 2 . ATI T/\Vi I lAO frt Oif ItH dfWIi inf Aiirtf Af I 17 k if A UAi*a A ruiuwil]^ OUUU jucau W OXV ill VIA IHLVJI V1CWO vi TT111LC 11VUDC personnel; submitting copies and/or reports of the FBI investigative results to Dean, and clearing proposed investi- gative activity through Dean. Failure to interview all CRP employees re Watergate; delay in reviewing CRP files; CRP attorneys sitting in on FBI interview of CRP employees, and CRP attorneys kmrincr o n/»no c f a TTHT a mofoniol HAT Jllg awvoo fcU £ AjTA 111^ IAA* Delay and/or failure to obtain access to and account for contents of Howard Hunt's desk and safe at the White House. 4. Failure to fully explore all possible ramifications of Watergate matter with subjects, suspects and potential material witnesses. 5. Delay or failure to interview several individuals re monies and/or checks found in possession of defendants or having been deposited to their bank accounts. 6. Failure to obtain and execute search warrants for search of original five subjects' homes, offices and automobiles. 7. Failure to identify and interview all persons listed in address books, notebooks, et cetera, which were seized and determined to be the property of the 7 original subjects. - 2 - CONTINUED - OVER Memorandum to The Director RE: WATERGATE INVESTIGATION - OPE ANALYSIS 8. Alleged failure to detect and remove ,T bug M from the telephone of Spencer Oliver in the Democratic National Committee Headquarters. 9. Failure to promptly and thoroughly investigate alleged election law violations by Segretti and others associated with CRP or the White House. 10. Alleged activities by former Acting Director Gray to limit, contain or obstruct FBI investigation of Watergate matter. 11. Alleged leaks of Watergate investigative results to news media. Congress or other unauthorized parties by Bureau personnel. 12. Failure to interview or inadequacy of interview with certain White House officials (Haldeman, Colson, Chapin, et cetera). 13. Alleged activities on part of Department of Justice officials to limit, contain, or obstruct FBI investigation (Kleindienst, Petersen, Silbert, et cetera). 14. Alleged attempt by CIA officials to interfere, contain or impede FBI Watergate investigation. 15. Alleged activities on part of White House officials to limit, contain or obstruct FBI Watergate investigation. (Dean, Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Colson, et cetera). General Investigative Division was furnished the 15 areas of criticism along with references as to origin and was requested to provide OPE with the following: -3- CONTINUED - OVER Memorandum to The Director RE: WATERGATE INVESTIGATION - OPE ANALYSIS (1 ) A brief summary of the investigative activity conducted which gave rise to the criticism. (2) General Investigative Division's appraisal of the validity of the criticism and how it might have been avoided. /o\ w; A a# maI m A«f n ^ w 1 : .* v, - v — ' ?| -• r 4 - J „«u 1 *% • ?X > / 74- . V f * ^ . . > l?P‘: >y * A’ i>-- s * i •a V.^>, -tvr r< ;v- f »'. ;fc FBI WATERGATE INVESTIGATION '1 V 4- i ) r 'r ...!.» r . r . • > < ^ • ‘ V ; Q ^ ™ : i . . - ■ ’ i * & *■ -i' jm&W - I i A *■* . - f^T ^ ^ r ' s\, ^ ; ; .- r. .- >; ; . V- : -5 ■ *£■ .' V >*£. W ff 3 . ^,1, • *\-V f • '• '• *V* ^ ♦ VK^fii f*v: ~st ■ ■■■•■- f ,-v~ OPE ANALYSIS/ ‘vl 1 -.Oi^Dr e:v^sr\ i t mr' *■ -n c V ■— t r v" < 4 v fr ^ * ' • v ^2; 1 ■ j t * y ?i :* ! & - i - fijT , «- . v* : ^ ■■ - c ' i -a ■**. >- “. - •' T* “ ' * - , r ■%■ >&. i ' :* ; i r 1 ! -;ivr 4** ** ■* » ^ ^ * v*rt •’rtijSo >■€ - -v • c : --d sfcWctMc 3y I> '?/" .*•* y. . *. --■ K-: •■ ■-' y j* >"r * ^ ’■ »<•**#>. ' ^ * s . ' • ' *^.'AVV ■w- ‘ A • i It. tCTi 'f . ' : v ipu* ME. -*4 *• l 't i. ..--*<8*5**, j- r ,-v^ -*r^v. ;' v*" i ; ./ ••» • r \ • £••>-» C-y.smtFSl.- GVXV1 • .- v :£i\‘£.'j; • ftV'H ; r ©=■> 1 :-■'•>• ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS .UNCLASSIFIED date -)l nlifc BY Sfr jrigrea^ July 5, 1974 ■t- . ^- • ■ r « 1- -j r. j rT ""-^ , '•-. v-v'.-/T *" J.-C : FBI WATERGATE INVESTIGATION OPE ANALYSIS Table of Contents l. PREDICATION 1 H. SCOPE OF STUDY 2 m. PREVIOUS AUDITS AND INSPECTION REVIEWS 5 IV. AREAS OF PRINCIPAL CRITICISM AND BUREAU POSITION REGARDING THESE CRITICISMS 10 1. Bureau activities relative to John W. Dean 10 2. Failure to interview all Committee to Re- Elect the President (CRP) employees and allowing CRP attorneys to monitor employee interviews 12 3. Delay and/or failure to obtain access to and contents of Howard Hunt's effects at the White House 20 4. Alleged failure to conduct comprehensive interviews with Watergate subjects, suspects and witnesses 23 5. Delay or failure to interview several individuals re monies and/or checks found in possession of defendants or having been deposited to their bank accounts 25 6 . Failure to obtain and execute search warrants for search of original five subjects' homes, U111UCJ5 dUU clUlUlllUUllCD o a ) 7. Failure to identify and interview all persons listed in address books, notebooks, et cetera, which were seized and determined to be the property of the five original subjects 31 8. Alleged failure to detect and remove ’bug” from the telephone of Spencer Oliver in the Democratic National Committee Headquarters 34 9. Failure to promptly and thoroughly investi- gate alleged election law violations by Segretti and others associated with CRP or the White House 38 10. Alleged activities by former Acting Director Gray to limit, contain or obstruct FBI investigation of Watergate matter 41 11. Alleged leaks of Watergate investigative results to news media, Congress or other unauthorized parties by Bureau personnel 47 12. Failure to interview or inadequacy of inter- view with certain White House officials 51 13. Alleged activities on part of certain Department of Justice officials to limit, contain, or obstruct FBI investigation 53 14. Alleged attempt by CIA officials to interfere, contain, or impede FBI Watergate investi- gation 57 15. Alleged activities on part of certain White House officials to limit, contain, or obstruct FBI Watergate investigation 61 16. Comments and Observations of General Investigative Division 63 V. WATERGATE INVESTIGATION - OPE ANALYSIS 66 APPENDICES A. B. C. Chronology of Significant Watergate Related Events 73 Biographical Sketch of Most Significant Subjects 90 1. Bernard L. Barker 90 2. Dwight L. Chapin 90 3. Charles W. Colson 91 4. JohnW. Dean m 91 5. John D. Ehrlichman 92 6. Virgilio Ramon Gonzalez 92 7. Harry Robbins Haldeman 93 8. George A. Hearing 93 9. E. Howard Hunt 94 10. Herbert W. Kalmbach 94 11. Egil E. Krogh, Jr. 95 12. Frederick C. LaRue 96 13. George Gordon Liddy 96 14. Jeb Stuart Magruder 97 15. Robert C. Mardian 98 16. Eugenio Rolando Martinez 98 17. James Walter McCord, Jr. 99 18. JohnN. Mitchell 100 19. Kenneth W. Parkinson 101 20. Herbert L. Porter 101 21. Donald H. Segretti 102 22. Gordon C. Strachan 103 23. Frank Anthony Sturgis 104 Explanatory Notes and Documentation 105 FBI WATERGATE INVESTIGATION OPE ANALYSIS I. PREDICATION: The Office of Planning and Evaluation (OPE) undertook a study and analysis of the Bureau's Watergate and related investigations based upon the Director’s instructions issued by memorandum dated May 14, 1974. In this memorandum the Director noted that recent revelations have newly introduced certain circumstances which may have a bearing on subsequent efforts to support the Bureau's investigative effort in the Watergate and related matters. He instructed OPE to pre- pare a complete analysis of the situation in order that the full ramifica- tions be determined and discussed. 1 ■ • f l i'-' !;■ Er*i ££"• ) n. SCOPE OF OPE STUDY: I ■ ■ ■■■ I ■■ ^ > ■ ^,1 H l M l Ml — ■! M ■ ! >■■ — + In view of the immense volume of the Watergate investi- gation, it was necessary for OPE to narrow the focus of this analysis to those areas of the investigation which have caused critical commentary in the Executive Branch, Congress, courts and the news media. In order to detect and identify specific areas of critical commentary relating to the Bureau’s performance in the Watergate and related investigations. the OPE staff undertook a review of selected materials which would pro- vide a comprehensive cross section of commentary regarding these investi- ■ - i- gations. Material reviewed to ascertain the most comment on specific criticisms included the following: ( 1 ) ( 2 ) Submission of Recorded Presidential Conversations to the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Repre- sentatives by President Richard Nixon, April 30, 1974. Report of Proceedings Held Before Senate Judiciary Committee re Nomination of Earl J. Silbert to be U. S. Attorney for the District of Columbia. (3) Senate Watergate Hearings. — 4* (4) A Piece of Tape: The Watergate Story: Fact and Fiction ; .tlfl by James W. McCord, Jr. .. 'V.vy • - (5) All the President’s Men, by Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward. (6) Watergate: The Full Inside Story , by Lewis Chester, et al. 1<- j* . • — , . _ . ^ i. - - ■__ BOORUM & PEASE “ N S Eyv* 1 " <§> BOORUM & PEASE (7) y 1 (7) The Judge Who Tried Harder by George V. Higgins in The Atlantic Magazine , April 1974. (8) Report of Hearings Held Before Senate Judiciary Committee re Nomination oi L. Patrick Gray III to be Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. (9) Watergate: Chronology of A Crisis ; (2 volumes) by The Congressional Quarterly ^ Numerous news media articles were also reviewed. In addition, summary memoranda prepared during the course of the investi- gation by both the Washington Field Office (WFO) and the General Investi- gative Division were reviewed. The results of previous Inspection Division reviews of the Watergate investigation were also analyzed. Only those cases directly relating to the Watergate burglary, the cover up of the burglary, the activities of the "White House Plumbers" group and illegal campaign activities have been incorporated within this analysis. Cases such as the "ITT" matter, the "milk fund" case, and the Vesco case are not included as they preceded the Watergate activities and are not directly connected with Watergate matters. .S* ’■ After the conclusion of the review process set forth supra OPE was able to define fifteen general areas of criticism which encompassed essentially the entire range of responsible public commentary on the Bureau’s involvement in and investigation of the Watergate matters. ( ":«.V These fifteen areas of criticism, which are set forth in Section V infra, were then referred to the General Investigative Division with appropriate references to the origin of criticism. The General Investigative Division was requested to provide OPE with the following information: (1) A brief summary of the investigative activity conducted which gave rise to the criticism. (2) General Investigative Division's appraisal of the validity of the criticism and how it might have been avoided. (3) Any changes of policy that have resulted from such criticism. (4) General Investigative Division's instructions (brief summary) to the field relating to any of the above cited matters. (5) Citations to file materials and communications which sub- stantiate the Bureau’s position in each of the areas mentioned above. After receipt of the above cited information, the position of the Bureau in regard to each area of criticism was carefully reviewed by OPE and where indicated original file materials were reviewed. There- after an analysis of the situation in each of the specified areas was con- ’ 1ST ducted. The results of this analysis are set forth in Section V of this paper. In order to place the complex events surrounding this most extensive case in proper perspective, this paper includes a summary of past audits of the investigation and an appendix designed to provide ready reference to data relating to Watergate matters. - 4 - in. PREVIOUS AUDITS AND INSPECTION REVIEWS From the outset of the Watergate investigation these cases have received the highest priority of supervision and direction, both in the Field and at the Headquarters level. Initial instructions to various field offices involved were transmitted telephonically by FBIHQ supervisors. These instructions were to give this case immediate priority attention under the personal supervision of the SAC. a personal Attention airtei was sent from Headquarters on June 20, 1972, to all field offices having outstanding leads. This airtei stated in part as follows: "This will confirm instructions to appropriate offices that all logical investigation is to receive immediate attention under the personal direction of SACs by as many SAs as are needed to insure absolute, thorough, immediate, imaginative investigation is conducted in this case. All leads are to be set out by telephone or teletype as appro- priate. Bureau is to be aware of all leads. Throughout this investigation there has been very close 1*1 A Wl MTT A T 1 A A A A ^ A ^ ^1 ^ w jr*fc O A A a ^ A ^ m uuujr \jk ctL\ aopctto uju uic ucvciupcu uy uit? ux uic uciu offices involved and by various components of the Headquarters super- visory staff. The Accounting and Fraud Section of the General Investi- gative Division has had the Headquarters supervisory responsibility mACf rtf fK O oi'rvof q on/I r« nlo tA/l m -i wt ? a /!+ irfo+i An ‘ ivt luv/mv v/i uiv auu icia i.cu uiuitoi □ uivuavi^atiuU) nuwcvci j ♦Explanatory notes and documentation appear in Appendix (C) of this paper violations of election laws have been supervised by the Civil Rights Section and the operation of the "Plumbers" ^ and Daniel Ellsberg matters have been supervised by the Intelligence Division. In August, 1973, a Watergate Special Matters Unit was established within the Accounting and Fraud Section to afford intensive Headquarters review and coordination of Watergate investigative matters and to handle liaison with the Special Prosecutor's Office. In addition to the intensive supervision that these cases have been given by SACs in the Field and by Headquarters supervisors and officials they have also been subjected to close review by the Inspection Division. During the inspection of WFO, March 8-27, 1973, the Watergate investigations were reviewed. No errors of substance were detected and no formal suggestions were rendered by the Inspection Staff. During the inspection of the General Investigative Division, July 30 - August 10, 1973, Watergate investigative matters and the Headquarter's supervision and coordination of these matters were closely reviewed. The inspection determined that the investigations were being vigorously and properly pursued, and were being afforded maximum direction and control. No errors of substance were detected or formal investigative suggestions rendered. 3 On May 22, 1973, former Acting Director William D. Ruckelshaus instructed that an analysis of allegations concerning the -gf 1 ) possible involvement by former Acting Director L. Patrick Gray m in actions to cover up, impede, or delay the Bureau’s Watergate investigation M be undertaken. 4 The Inspection Division was assigned this task with the assistance of the Office of Legal Counsel. On May 23, 1973, Mr. Carl Eardley, Executive Assistant to then Acting Director Ruckelshaus, who had been given the responsibility of conducting a thorough analysis of the Bureau's Watergate investigations, posed a series of thirty questions to Bureau officials concerning the initial handling of the case and the related activities of Mr. Gray. ® Based upon this series of questions the Inspection Division separated its inquiry into two distinct phases as follows: A. Publicized Allegations Concerning Former Acting Director L. Patrick Gray in. 4 - B. Pertinent Events at Initial Stages of Case and Questions Relative Thereto Posed by Mr. Eardley. Mr. Eardley ’s questions were primarily based upon an informal log relating to the Watergate case maintained by then Assistant Director Bates. This log recorded events relating to the Watergate investigation involving Mr. Bates from June 21, 1972, to July 6, 1972. The Inspection Division coordinated the preparation of responses to Mr. Eardley's questions and furnished the facts to Acting Director Ruckelshaus by letterhead memorandum dated June 7, 1973. ® This document which is captioned "Watergate - Events at Initial Stage of Case" was furnished to the Special Prosecutor's Office on June 7, 1973, and completed phase B of the Inspection Division review. - 7 - The Inspection Division completed its analysis of the activities of former Acting Director Gray on June 26, 1973. Ten specific allegations were addressed in the analysis set forth in a memorandum which is twelve pages in length. The most significant aspect of the Inspection staff's analysis appears to be the following observations: ”In considering possible impediments to obtaining the full facts of the Watergate case the furnishing of numerous FBI reports and other communications by Gray to Dean must be considered. . . It is true there is no evidence in the files indicating this action by Gray impeded our investigation from an investigator’s standpoint. Access by Dean to our investi- gation would logically indicate to him what information had been developed and which would enable him to work out strategy to cover up the case. Likewise, the destruction by Gray of documents apparently furnished him from Hunt’s safe would have impeded the investigation although this cannot be stated positively since we do not know what specific material he destroyed, if any.”^ On April 10, 1974, the Inspection Division’s analysis of Mr. Gray's activities relating to the Watergate investigation were furnished to the Special Prosecutor’s Office along with 32 other Bureau f j- documents. ° These documents were furnished to the Special Pro- k secutor’s Office based upon a formal request received March 19, 1974 for copies of memoranda prepared during 1973 dealing with possible violations of law by L. Patrick Gray HI. £ « U i i - < f > iL #>• V*., o : - 9 - IV. AREAS OF CRITICISM AND COMMENTS 1. Allowing John Dean to sit in on interviews of White House personnel; submitting copies and/or reports of the FBI investigative results to Dean, and clearing proposed investigative activity through Dean. 3 COMMENTS: On June 19, 1972, WFO by teletype requested authority to interview Charles W. Colson since information had been developed that Hunt had worked for Colson at the White House. On June 22, 1972, Mr. Gray telephonically authorized then Assistant Director Bates to have WFO contact John Dean to set up interview with Colson. Dean sub- sequently indicated he would sit in on interviews of White House personnel and all requests for investigation at the White House had to be cleared through him. Criticism of FBI interviews in the presence of Dean and clearing proposed investigative activities through him is justified. However, there appeared no alternative to WFO and to the Accounting and Fraud Section to following this procedure since the decision concerning this apparently had been made between Mr. Gray and Dean, and neither Bureau supervisors nor field agents were in a position to overrule decisions of the Acting Director. With respect to the submitting of copies of FBI reports to Dean, this is probably the most serious blunder from an investigative -10- standpoint made by Mr. Gray. The facts concerning this development became known outside Mr. Gray’s staff for the first time on February 5, 1973. This is long after the substantive investigation into the Democratic National Committee Headquarters (DNCH) break-in was completed and, in fact, was after the trial of those originally implicated was completed. While Dean’s role as the master manipulator of the cover up was unknown and, in fact, the cover up itself was unknown during the investigation, obviously the furnishing to Dean by Mr. Gray of our reports allowed Dean the total opportunity to plan a course of action to thwart the FBI’s investigation and grand jury inquiry. There was no way that FBI personnel could have avoided this situation since it was unknown that Mr. Gray was furnishing the reports to Dean. til ^ l ^ i — — j-l ±ut? principal ic©©uu tu mc lcamcu irvui tin© 1© mat xareijr should we conduct interviews in the presence of an attorney and never should we allow the same attorney to sit in on all interviews relative to a certain situation. Further, FBI reports should be disseminated only Ilk A A /I A Al A M A n >1 A/IM^AllnltT A 1 A 4k A 1 X 7k -* 4 A UaII A A IG LHC piyoctuiui CtllU tctuuiuy UCVCl tu LUC VV 11.LLC 11VU3C* I 2. Failure to interview all Committee to Re-Elect the President (CRP) employees re Watergate; delay in reviewing CRP files; CRP attorneys sitting in on FBI interview of CRP employees, and CRP attorneys having access to FBI file material. McCord states that if FBI had interviewed Robert Reisner, Magruder's assistant at CRP, the "Gemstone" file and Mitchell’s role in the DNC wire- tapping would have been uncovered. COMMENTS: There was no apparent reason to interview all the several hundred employees for CRP and such a shotgun approach to the investigation was never considered by WFO or by the Bureau. Rather, since we had definite leads to CRP in view of the arrest of McCord, our investigation proceeded upon logical lines. Specifically, we initially concentrated on identifying McCord’s associates at the security end of CRP. We were endeavoring to determine whether others at CRP were involved in the conspiracy. We tried to determine who hired McCord; what finances were made available to him; and who worked with him. We also concentrated on endeavoring to develop any tie-ins between Hunt and CRP since information was developed at the White House that a memorandum had been written by Richard Howard to Bruce Kehrli recommending that Hunt be dropped at the White House and picked up at 1701 (the address of CRP Headquarters was 1701 - 12 - Pennsylvania Avenue, NW). We also sought through interviews at CRP to obtain similar-type information concerning Alfred Baldwin. We also conducted interviews at CRP concerning the financing of the DNCH break-in in view of the information developed by Miami on June 22, 1972, relative to the $89, 000 in Mexican bank drafts and the $25, 000 cashier’s check of Dahlberg. We conducted additional intensive interviews of CRP personnel concerning Liddy who was identified as a contact of the Watergate burglars when we got hold of Barker's and Martinez' address books from the Metropolitan Police Department on June 23, 1972. Those address books contained the name ’’George,” beside which was the number we determined to be used by Liddy at CRP. In all, we conducted about 60 interviews of CRP people including interviews of several of them more than one time. Of this number, several obviously lied to us, most notably John Mitchell, Jeb Magruder, Bart Porter, Sally Harmony and Maurice Stans. Hugh Sloan never permitted us to interview him but finally permitted an interview of him by the AUSAs after Sloan’s attorney held discussions prior thereto with the AUSAs. (Sloan, over national television before the Ervin Committee, said the FBI never interviewed him about the Watergate matter, which is true, although he incorrectly made it appear we did not desire or try to interview him. ) 1 ) • OU n nn vm A T 5 fii O V-* 0 1 * AATTai 1 JL UU liailiC Ui AVULTVl V 1 WAOUV 1 UVr » VI. ciirfd#*A /1 rtni* H-V VU U%U Ulg VUi investigation at CRP Headquarters and during our numerous interviews there. It is apparent he was hiding from us and, in fact, WFO learned in April, 1973, when Magruder started telling the truth, that he had i a t a Vh i n « tf irantiierrea rteisner lruiu iiia juu ivict^i uuci #1 n nnj rtlvrti o aosi^uiiu auuut July 5, 1972, obviously to keep Reisner from coming to our attention. It is a sad fact that Rob Odle, whom we interviewed several times, failed to tell us, the Federal grand jury or the AUSAs of his activities on T- — — _ HI W 4 ft m JL. — 1 — — — ^ jw J m X. a 1 a. a a a a a a ^ K a /vm % dune ii, i^f^, wniun uiciuu^u <1 teiepiiuiitJ uuiivtsxsttiiuu wim iviogi uuci who told Odle to have Reisner clean out Magruder’s files. Odle actually took the ’’Gemstone” file home with him that night but this was never mentioned to us. It is also observed that Reisner never came forward _ i ii i - - J ;_i a i_r * a iu C4, — aunuuga ne ceriaimy nau uuormaiion aiiu me ujjjjurtuiiity . It is also interesting to note that only three out of the same 60 CRP people we interviewed recontacted us for interviews outside CRP premises. It is apparent that most CRP people in the - # *i Al 7 rt ^11 l. 1 H summer oi ltnz were quite willing to lie and/or to ten us cuiiaiueraujy less than the full truth. It is further interesting that Magruder and Porter have now been prosecuted for their lies; Mitchell is under indictment for lying; and Stans is being investigated for Obstruction of Justice (OOJ). MSa-u-i .i. „ y v» L-- i ) On no less than seven occasions durine the Deriod June 19- - - W A. ----- - . . _ . _ 1 29, 1972, did the investigating agents request records and documentation from Robert C. Odle, Jr. . Director of Administration for CRP; Judy r r / » Hoback, Accounting Department, Finance CRP; and Robert L. Houston, Security Coordinator, CRP, concerning McCord’s employment; payroll records for individuals employed by McCord; an inventory of McCord’s electronic equipment and copies of supporting invoices; copies of all disbursements from CRP to McCord and McCord’s Associates during the period November 15, 1971 to June 19, 1972; the identities of the personnel employed by McCord who would have worked at CRP ; and records con- cerning Alfred C. Baldwin HI. The investigation developed that there were two situations in which CRP files apparently were destroyed. All our investigation was reported to and discussed with the AUSAs; was the subject of lengthy Federal grand jury inquiry; but the evidence was not sufficient to warrant 00 J indictments. Finance records such as ledgers and records regarding contributors were destroyed about April 6, 1972, prior to the date on which the new regulations relative to disclosure of the names of con^ tributors and the expenditure of funds went into effect on April 7, 1972. Second, there apparently was destruction of material having to do with Liddy’s intelligence gathering operation. Herbert Porter on July 19, 1972, advised he threw away receipts Liddy gave for the money that Porter re- -trtif, ■« vwr^jf • - 15 - r %v •,. ■. •.'. r ..jj'. ’i ■'•&frtr**'tl: ...b^! ■ v ■ . •■* •■ ’'• ■ - : •..■•^ ^a f**Aw CIaqa +a mod An t A T 4 n/4 oil Affo^lir T Ji1i4v Mt vv^ibT vu iiuiu uiufui tu ua w uiuuj hum suiv^viuj UAUUJ uovu ||tv shredder on June 17, 1972, after the arrest at the Waterga.ce . ■, -„*! .-..• '* . . ■• ' ’■ - \ • -7 ' "'■ ' -*■ . . ... ci /\ » v i A y\nln r\ *»/vWrtls.tTT +V A 1 A r» A An^l «v% Avmama w Ja JIaaIIiam ouluc wuvuuicuio, ui uuauiy uiq iuto auu ujcuiui duu4 uc•*>'• T - " J *- *v. ' - S hi n A HAnAM^Arl A 4“ A^AwJt A A A AO A^Awki Vlv aVv A 1*4. Ua» aIaa AAmAAWA cuqu i cpuucu uiai wiuvvuu d aaoiouuii, iwuct i uuuou/i|| icuiuvCM ,. . ( . , ; a*'.': •.,< *’ .: . •• .-•* '. V '•■ "-r . . •£•• • i ' 7 * material from the CRP offices over the weekend of June 17 throbg! - ■ - ; : • ..a a _ _ _ . \ J ■* *‘ •■■ ■-» T.._ ~ f O /lT« J.a 1 J J.L. £ A 1 _ - =i ,_ . t_4 dune io, ui^;. \nc lulu us uus wd& some d^uipui^iu ne was wurKin^ jv.vj with, it was not destroyed but returned to the office. ) Accox diiig to Millicent GleasOn, a security Oincerai CRP, when interviewed on July 1, 1972, Robert Houston, early in _ JL1. ^ #»1 _ 1 f _ Ji *__ 1.1 morning of June 18 , 1 S 72 , went to cne me caomet in me security oil ice and began removing files. When the FBI interviewed Houston, he denied i'i J. 'ivv- .•' . ... *v ,x af. j y. it and we were unable to obtain other corroboration from the other CRP people. v , •• ■* V -^.^'■4 V ■' ■ H ■**+?: ■ •/J*'.-* - • k - •• .. j * ?:■■*-*. $VtT 1 • 1 « aiso, t*aiawin toia us on uuiy iu, l y vz, ne prepared *■■...>, .^..3 of the telephone conversations from which McCord prepared type<4 memoranda. We did not then know if those memoranda still exist No one interviewed except Baldwin from whom the information abou$ • •• '^.v'c-r- •=":. ^ the logs and memoranda was originally obtained, would admit tp know-rW ^ ->: ^ ^ ;#■• *' r . , ' • 7 ^ ■ 3ijy£ . • ledge of them. In fact, case agent Lano advised he heard Liddy’s attorney * V r 3 J • ' *■- state m closing comments to the jury that, in effect, Liddly'^pfroydd 1 ' ' ; - V r : ’« ^ evidence, possibly the memoranda, soon after the arrests on June 17. 1972, ^ vj&sSS&t using the CKP shredder. ‘•^'rvr" ' ‘ ' ''"hl ~ ?\S r '• *Kk: * . \ . •• .'5 - 16 - , •"+/ »!••':.■ ••'.••• : '•• • ■' v • S. V" ,^‘vV ^ ^ On July 18, 1972, Judith Hoback, then Assistant to the Treasurer of the Finance CRP, advised us that about five ledger books used to record cash were destroyed prior to April 7, 1972. Also, all bank accounts of the Finance CRP were closed on April 6, 1972, and all pertinent records destroyed. Mrs. Hoback also told us that she heard from unrecalled persons at the office that Liddy was shredding office papers on the day of the burglary. She said she believed all lists of contributors were destroyed prior to April 7, 1972. We pursued this shredding angle but could never develop firsthand information. On June 30, 1972, Stephen Anderson, a security guard at CRP, was interviewed in the presence of CRP attorney H. Donald Kistler. He furnished only negligible information at the time but late in the day on June 30, 1972, he telephoned WFO and requested to speak to the agents who had previously interviewed him. He told us that on the evening of June 16, 1972, McCord stayed at the CRP office much later than usual and instructed Anderson to get a key for each desk, file cabinet and office on the second floor of CRP (the Finance CRP floor). McCord told him the Finance CRP had some papers which they had ordered to be destroyed and the desks and cabinets would have to be checked to verify this destruction. Anderson assembled the keys and placed them on top of a file cabinet with written instructions as to what was to be done with the keys. Anderson also advised that Penny Gleason told him that on June 18, 1972, she observed Robert Houston going through file cabinets of McCord and removing papers. Houston told Gleason he had to burn the - 17 - papers. However, Houston denied such actions to us. With respect to the CRP attorneys sitting in on our inter- views at CRP Headquarters, such arrangements were made between CRP attorney Kenneth Parkinson, USA Titus and AUSA Silbert. Parkinson represented to these men that he would like to sit in on the interviews in view of the fact that CRP was the defendant in the civil damage suit 4-u~v xt— ± i mcu u y uic jJCLUuuiauc lxcliiulull v^umiuiticc. to allow Parkinson to sit in provided there was no interference in the questioning of the CRP personnel by the agents. A few days later it developed that the CRP attorneys who were sitting in on the interviews K/SCPOrt f rt inf ttji fV» n A i 4 r»/Y ol »n t* f A UVgon tu t W JIU1 ClllU OiUW^U UU1 LO iv wauuvv interviews by not being available. This interference was made known to Silbert by WFO and since Parkinson was adamant that counsel had to be present during these interviews to protect CRP, Silbert began sub- questioned without having CRP attorneys present. Further to the point that we had difficulty in conducting interviews outside the presence of counsel was our experience during the investigation of the transmitter found on a telephone of R. Spencer Oliver, DNCH, September 13, 1972. DNCH advised agents of WFO that it would not permit the interview of its employees without the presence of an attorney representing DNCH unless that employee specifically requested - 18 - that the attorney not be present. A total of 61 employees at DNCH were interviewed in the presence of an attorney. Although we did not make available any FBI material to ~ _ - CRP attorneys, apparently Dean allowed Mardian, Parkinson and Paul O'Brien (CRP counsel) to review some of the reports which Mr. Gray furnished to Dean. This subversion of our investigation was not known to the Bureau but Dean testified in the Summer of 1973 to this before the Ervin Committee. - 19 - 3 . Delay and/or failure to obtain access to and account for contents of Howard Hunt's desk and safe at the White House. * COMMENTS: On June 17, 1972 Hunt's probable involvement in the Watergate incident came to WFO’s attention because of his country club bill found in the Watergate Hotel and because of information contained in Barker’s address book. WFO, about 6:00-7:00 pm, June 17, 1972, contacted Butterfield of the White House and learned that Hunt had pre- viously worked as a consultant to the White House. Butterfield was told Hunt may be involved in the DNCH burglary. On June 18, 1972, Butterfield recontacted WFO and advised that Hunt had worked for Charles Colson, Special Counsel to the President. On June 19, 1972, SA Saunders reviewed Hunt’s personnel file at the White House and also called White House number 456-2282 (which number was contained in Barker's address book), asked to speak to Mr. Hunt and was informed that he had not come to his office that day. On the afternoon of June 19, 1972, WFO by teletype requested Bureau authority to interview Colson. On June 22, 1972, upon Mr. Gray's instructions, then Assistant Director Bates, at about 10:25 am, authorized SAC Kunkel to have agents contact Dean to discuss an interview with Colson and discuss obtaining of telephone toll call records involving Hunt at the White House. Thereafter, SA Saunders contacted Dean to set up interview of Colson which was conducted on the afternoon of June 22, 1972, in Dean's office with Dean present. During the interview when Colson said that he believed Hunt had worked on the third floor of the building, SA Lano asked Dean if the agents could accompany Dean to Hunt’s office on the third floor to determine if Hunt may have left anything there. Dean stated that this was the first he was aware of this office. In response to an Agent’s request to examine the office, Dean advised the White House would provide the FBI with any contents belonging to Hunt. On the morning of June 26, 1972, Dean called SA Lano and advised he had something to turn over to the FBI. SAs Mahan and Michael J. King were then sent to Dean's office. At approximately 11:00 am, Dean gave these agents a box con- taining some of Hunt's effects and between 4:00 and 4:30 pm, June 26, 1972, Dean’s assistant, Fred Fielding, gave same agents a second box of Hunt's effects. It is not apparent from the foregoing that there is any validity to criticism of Bureau agents for delay in obtaining access to Hunt’s space at the White House. The Accounting and Fraud Section cannot explain why the interview of Colson, which was recommended June 19, 1972, was not approved by Mr. Gray until June 22, 1972. As soon as his approval was obtained, immediate steps were taken to inter- view Colson. As set out above, Dean thwarted our efforts to gain access to Hunt’s office at the White House. - 21 - The possibility of obtaining a search warrant for Hunt's office at the White House and the fact that we did not have the necessary probable cause is discussed later under Item #6. - 22 - 4 . Failure to fully explore all possible ramifications of Watergate matter with subjects, suspects and potential material witnesses. COMMENTS: This criticism is absolutely false and has no basis in fact. To the contrary, our agents were in fact very thorough in exploring all aspects with every possible subject, suspect and witness. It is an absolute fact that we conducted thousands of interviews and tracked down and interviewed all the people who were indicated to have been in contact with the subjects. Not one of the subjects of the investigation would talk to our agents and none of them would cooperate with the AUSAs or testify before the Federal grand jury despite very substantial efforts which were made to endeavor to secure cooperation and the full story. This included an unsuccessful effort to immunize Gonzalez (who was considered to be the likely best prospect for immunity) and at least two efforts by Silbert to give McCord a deal in exchange for his cooperation. There is absolutely no question that the conspiracy in this case was broken only when the time came when some of those inside the conspiracy, specifically McCord, Dean and Magruder, came to feel that it was to their better self-interest to tell their stories. An investigation succeeds in discovering the total truth only when investigators have the opportunity to interview different suspects thoroughly, to compare the information obtained and exploit differences in stories obtained. We were prevented from making any benefit from this necessary investigative f technique by the fact that all of those involved who would talk lied and kept their stories straight and together. Since Dean was kept completely informed of our investigation by Mr. Gray and apparently to some extent by Assistant Attorney General Petersen, there was no possibility that we could get a break. As a matter of fact the testimony of former Attorney AM TaU n In. a/au/v i-l* /V m. / _ ' 1 *V% ^ 4-4 jT\ r\ AM vjtriiera.1 duiiii iviiLUEit:ii uciurc uic: m vm V/Uiuuuuct; uu T, . 1 *v uuijf 1 A X Vi lAf70 1910 1X1 discussing the cover up best sums up this matter when he stated in part that the effort of those very high-level Executive Branch people was ". . .keeping the lid on and no information volunteered. " This rather mirt/titt xj n n rtrtimt c frvr* fVta #o /*f +K o f rloonitck 4-V> r\ **Anfr4\ ntiocf iAn inrr V\tt ouvtiutu) avtvumo iv* uiv iuvi tnat j mj u«i agents, those interviewed, from Ehrlichman, Mitchell and on down, replied in the negative regarding knowledge of anything having to do with the break-in and bugging or that they had gotten any information from McCord, T.iHHv Ar Hnnf A-« &VtV«J VA AXUUVa - 24 - 5. 5. Delay or failure to interview several individuals re monies and/or checks found in possession of defendants or having been deposited to their bank accounts. COMMENTS: At the time of the subjects' arrests on June 17, 1972, and subsequent search of their hotel rooms at the Watergate Hotel, Washington, D. C. , 44 new one hundred dollar bills were found, some of which were sequentially numbered. It was determined from the Bureau of Engraving and Printing on June 19, 1972, that the Prefix F bills were distributed to the Miami Branch, Atlanta Federal Reserve Bank (FRB), and the Prefix C bills were distributed to the FRB, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, during early February, 1972. On June 20, 1972, records of FRB, Miami, disclosed the foregoing one hundred dollar bills were part of a $50,000 shipment on April 18, 1972, to the Republic National Bank, Miami, at which bank Bernard L. Barker maintained a business account. A review on June 21 and June 22, 1972, of this account showed that Barker, on April 20, 1972, deposited four drafts totaling $89,000 drawn on the Banco Internacional, Mexico City, Mexico, all payable to l- Sr. Manuel Ogarrio. On May 8, 1972, Barker received cash for these checks including $10, 000 in new one hundred dollar bills (serial numbers not recorded by the bank according to the banker when interviewed June 21, 1972). - 25 - "J It was also developed that on April 20, 1972 Barker had presented a cashier's check dated April 10, 1972, payable to Kenneth Dahlberg, drawn on the First Bank and Trust Company of Boca Raton, Florida, for which Barker received cash. Investigation showed Dahlberg to be a prominent Minneapolis businessman and fund raiser for CRP. Efforts to interview Dahlberg initially on June 22, June 23, June 24, and June 26, 1972, were unsuccessful as he evaded our agents and finally on June 26, 1972, declined interview on the basis of his counsel's advice. Mr. Helms, then Director of CIA, on June 28, 1972, allegedly informed Mr. Gray orally that tfcp l^f recorded contact ofegt rtr A • 1_ 11 * __ A AO A AA A A f?A l wiun JLraniuerg w as in may, -gs*, tv it i, ivir* urray instructed Mr. Felt that among those CIA employees or contacts not to be interviewed or investigated at that time because of national security considerations were Dahlberg and Ogarrio. It was not until July 6, 1972, Llidt mi VT way, *%. .-1 mm a *■ dUUUl Ulllg 4* IV II. 1VU o^itra. and Ogarrio interviews. It is interesting to note that General Walters, then Deputy Director, CIA, furnished memorandum to Mr. Gray dated July 6, 1972, which in part stated that Mr. Gray was orally advised on Tim A 9 7 o nH Tun a OQ 1 079 fVi of Horo nni a ind 'Pin blho r*rr TUAT»fl W UUV U f U41U KJ U41V £J 1 V IU j U1UI. A X 1U UllU g 1, J, VJLJ ^ nVl V not involved with CIA and were open for FBI interview. Dahlberg was interviewed July 6, 1972, when he claimed that $25, 000 represented contributions he accumulated while he was - 26 - t staying in Southeast Florida prior to and during early April, 1972; however, in August, 1972, Dahlberg changed his story and admitted the contribution was in fact that of Dwayne Andreas, a prominent businessman who wished to make an anonymous contribution. if ic that Mi* Hno xr incfnipforl fhaf PTA AtvinlnvPft.C! Ar prtnf a rtfi kIVMlWVl 4TAA * \JA WJ 11IW4 MV^VVI MAViV VAA A Wlrf VA J not be interviewed or investigated because of national security considerations. advised to hold up on the interview. It is noted that in memorandum C. Bolz to e>\ Mt * Rafos Tiuia 9.Q 1Q79 it ts cfafAH ffiaf Mr RAlm.Q PTA a/fvispH fhp “ ~ ~ T XJ VUAV « W y Jk V V ftd y .4. V AV WVM VV U Vi iWV V ill jfl» * **■ w* | \/ U Jk j » *i-r v t; Acting Director that agency has never had any interest in MatMOtl . j* 4^ -a* - 27 - •’a*s? and has had no interest in Kenneth Dahlberg since 1961. With Mr. Gray’s and Ogarrio is valid only if leveled against Mr. Gray, assuming he was aware on June 27, 1972, that no restrictions by CIA were placed on our interviews of Dahlberg and Ogarrio. The criticism of Mr. Gray might not be valid if he had been misled by CIA or someone else such as Dean or Ehrlichman, especially since during the early stages of this investigation there were very real indications that the FBI’s investigation may be leading into a CIA operation with respect to the money or the burglary of DNCH itself; however, we did not develop solid evidence as the investigation progressed to indicate that CIA was involved in the planning or execution of the Watergate break-in. In any event, the criticism is not valid if leveled against the execution of investigative responsibility by the Accounting and Fraud Section or the Field. 6 . Failure to obtain and execute search warrants for search of original five subjects' homes, offices and automobiles. COMMENTS: This particular criticism has received widespared publicity from four principal sources, each of which should know better. Probably the primary criticism has been directed to us by NBC broadcaster Carl Stern who provided "expert legal opinion" during the nationally televised Ervin Committee hearings, closely followed by McCord and Senators Hart and Ervin of the Senate Judiciary Committee. The fact is that con- siderable consideration was given to obtaining search warrants and in each instance in which we could meet the constitutional requirements of the Fourth Amendment, search warrants were obtained. It should be common knowledge of individuals having legal training and that includes Stern, McCord and Senators Hart and Ervin, that probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant specifically includes: 1) That there is knowledge which can be testified to before a Magistrate that there is present at a certain location, evidence, fruits or instrumentalities of a crime; and 2) Information must be recent and must be corroborated. Mere suspicion is not probable cause. It was the opinion of AUSA Silbert in the Summer of 1972, which continues to the present as he stated in his testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee on April 23, 1974, that there was not probable ') cause to sustain a search warrant for McCord’s home or office. WFO did conduct extensive investigation, including interviews of McCord's neighbors, to endeavor to develop evidence that anyone had seen electronic equipment or McCord’s truck at his home shortly after the arrest but this investi- gation did not bear fruit. The first positive evidence we developed that bugging equipment had been taken to McCord’s home after the arrest was obtained on July 10, 1972, from Alfred Baldwin. Since this was 23 days after the date that Baldwin drove McCord’s truck with equipment to McCord’s home, it was Silbert’s opinion that too much time had elapsed to permit the obtaining of a search warrant then. The lack of probable cause also kept us from obtaining search warrants for Hunt’s home and offices as well as the homes and offices of the other defendants. It is interesting to note that search warrants were obtained by the Metropolitan Police Department, with FBI assistance, for two rooms at the Watergate Hotel occupied by the subjects the night of the arrests, which rooms were searched on June 17, 1972, An automobile rented in Washington, D. C. , by the subjects was also searched pursuant to a search warrant. In addition, when information was obtained on June 21, 1972 from an informant in Miami that Martinez had a car parked at the Miami Airport which was reported to contain a gun and other evidence, Miami obtained a search warrant for this car and the car was searched. Based on the foregoing, it appears this criticism is totally without merit. - 30 - 7. Failure to identify and interview all persons listed in the address books, notebooks, et cetera, which were seized and determined to be the property of the seven original subjects. COMMENTS: The Barker and Martinez address books were seized by the Metropolitan Police Department as a result of the search of the two rooms at the Watergate Hotel, occupied by the arrested subjects on June 17, 1972. The search warrants which legally authorized search of these two rooms were obtained by Metropolitan Police Department officers and the items seized were taken by the police officers. About June 23, 1972, SA Lano, through contact with the Metropolitan Police Department officers, obtained access to the Barker and Martinez address books for investigative use and the books themselves were returned to the Metropolitan Police Department. On June 26, 1972, AUSA Silbert requested the FBI to take possession of the evidence seized including the books which were officially turned over to WFO by the Metropolitan Police Department on June 28, 1972. By airtel dated June 23, 1972, to Miami, WFO forwarded two photographic copies of each of these address books for investigative assistance of Miami and instructed Miami to review both books and conduct appropriate investigation regarding the information set forth in the books. WFO had already extracted information from the books concerning names, addresses and telephone numbers in the Washington, D. C. , Maryland and 1 Virginia areas and conducted investigation concerning each of these notations and all persons interviewed. In January, 1973, during the trial 11.*. • 1 - j 4- jt-, 2 J. i 4 .u» ti 4 - ui me original seven ueienu!■ WT -* r rt- . - Tl.f - 32 - and which was focused on tying Hunt and Liday into the conspiracy. It would have been much better had Miami later contacted all of the individuals in these books not previously interviewed, in the interest of total com- pleteness of die investigation. However, interestingly enough, the judgment n »_i _ *_ _ t - .1 Lt. 1 1 - .1 _ oi me Miami special Agents wno reviewed xnese dooks ana selected targets for interviews proved to be good since the contacts of those individuals whom we had not interviewed, by the press, did not bring to light any additional information. Considerable consideration was given in January, * Afro 13 IO i.n mtA 1 ^. l : J-L ~ • n — i j .±. .. j 4 - ^ j , uy rDinv^ vu Having uns imuvjLuuais nut diruituy juutrivitiwtru, uuiiustuLeu by Miami. This proposal was not accepted by Mr. Gray, and probably rightfully so, on the premise that had we conducted these interviews during the trial, there no doubt would have been sensational press stories tUnt 44* A PDT tun O iHii inrr if n iwtTrt i nrn f i /\w 11 fhi 4 4- wi n 1 O i« AiYvt AC* fl uLa.v uv^ i ui w aa /rTL«n i a I.L a uii me oiaui uvui opaec at iui wuc tap ucviuco. \ a iuo lo uic floor on which the original arrests were made and is the floor containing O’Brien's; Oliver’s; and the rest of the offices of the principal Democratic Committee personnel. ) Mr. Connor advised that no record was main- vvtxiiv u r»rr fko AV4V1UUJ lllg UlVf ononifi a if orvi o rtf falnnUnna /vr ini 1 WAVU UUU UV ff U-kJ |+\*T 1UV« WJf VAIVAX WUlVim^U that this room need not be checked. This room was adjacent to Oliver’s aWi aa Knl k«*/1 nA intorAArmontinor Hortr In ntiuAr T c nffi^n cinH KaH nn IpIp- Ulliv^ K/Ut 1U4M 11V inlltV/J. WiUiVVVli^ V* - ' A W V/ V* phone service in connection with Oliver's office. Both Mr. Connor and Kic QQGiqtQnt adviepd that thp Jijnp 1 7-18 , 1972 , check Included talcing th6 Il^kJ VM14V l*V* f VAIMi telephones physically apart for visual inspection for foreign items and none were found. Each of these men recalled that Oliver's office was one of those included in their survey. We conducted an extremely detailed investigation concerning the September 13, 1972, wiretap device removed from Oliver's telephone but did not succeed in developing any positive information concerning that device. The Laboratory, which is well qualified to render such a statement, has stated that the device removed from Oliver's telephone was not there in June, 1972. The telephone company personnel stated the same thing. Mr. Silbert apparently still believes, as indicated in his testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee on April 23, 1974, that the Bureau "goofed” in its security survey in June, 1972. It is his prerogative to hold this view even though we have previously furnished him with all the above mentioned facts. This criticism apparently will not die, the matter appears insoluble and there is no way we can further refute this criticism. - 37 - 1 A 57 . m— ;i - XI 3 XI T 3 ranure io prumpuy ana morougniy investigate anegea election law violations by Segretti and others associated with CRP or iu« na.ii* 17 uic wiiitc nuusc. ~ COMMENTS: Information concerning Donald Henry Segretti came to our attention on June 22, 1972, during the early stages of the Watergate investigation when the thrust of the FBI’s efforts was logically concentrated on the original seven defendants. We interviewed Segretti who was not cooperative in furnishing useful information. Thereafter we conducted extensive investigation to try to determine his possible involvement in the DNCH break-in conspiracy. When it became obvious that Segretti was not a part of that conspiracy but rather was only involved in campaign ’’dirty tricks,” a possible but unlikely Election Laws matter, we ceased investigating him with AUSA Silbert's concurrence. The long-standing Department policy regarding Election Laws is that allegations of violations are referred to the Department of Justice and no additional investigation is conducted unless specifically requested by the Department. Our reports containing results of investi- gation including information concerning Segretti ’s activities were disseminated to Assistant Attorney General Petersen. We properly did not pursue the Election Laws aspect as we were not requested to do so by the Department. - 38 - When massive newspaper publicity about Segretti’s activities began in the second week of October, 1972, principally in the form of articles written by "The Washington Post" reporters Bernstein and Woodward, the Acting Director instructed then Legal Counsel Assistant Director Daibey to review the newspaper stories and the analysis of same which had been made by the General Investigative J_ _ 1J ♦ . 1 % * V 1 « mvision, to determine wnetner oegretti was in violation oi r eaerai law. Mr. Daibey was of the opinion that the information available was too nonspecific to put Segretti in violation of any Federal law except possibly Election Laws matters. t— i Afro xl*- o hi iigui ui uiia, uu wiuucr 11, uieu ot?cuiun Charles Bolz of the Accounting and Fraud Section, contacted Assistant A WftlW ATT rt n "H rt 1 T5 A« A Ottlm t T\«»i ni m nl n tn -TXtVVt ll^Jf VC11CX (U JTCtClOCll l/l U1C Vrimilldl JL/J. V iOlUU ICldLlVC LVJ CLLi O activities as he had related them to us and as set forth in the then recent ififitiA rvf Tt ThA Wo chinrrfrm Pnct tf ¥ r ^L/llAAJL) My* Dofot^con x >uvvi c o rhri WUT 1MVV4 fKof UIUV lira sli/Y not conduct investigation of Segretti’s alleged political harassment those activities unless the Department made a specific request for investi ffation. Mr. Petersen advised Mr Pn1<7. he was fnllv aware nf the ev+ent O — — “ — ^ »»»» Y V ■*■■*-* A*, w IF ■ f "W V*. wh 4 v V4¥W 1AV of the FBI’s investigation and said he did not believe Segretti’s activities were in violation of any Federal statutes. Accordingly, he could see no basis for requesting additional investigation of the FBI at that time. This criticism of the FBI is not justified as we performed in accordance with established practice. The fact that the Special Prosecutor's Office, when it was established, decided to have us pursue Segretti's activities is not indicative of any prior dereliction on the part of the FBI. We still conduct full investigation of possible Election Laws violations only upon request of the Department or of the USA. (FBIHQ clears such USA requests for full investigation through the Department before the field is authorized to conduct same. ) It is interesting to note that the exhaustive investigation of Segretti’s "dirty tricks" activities conducted pursuant to the Special Prosecutor's request, has not resulted in any prosecutive activity. The prosecution of Segretti which has been done grew out of a separate FBI investigation, conducted at the request of the Criminal Division, months before the Special Prosecutor's Office was established. - 40 - ) 10. Alleged activities by former Acting director Gray to limit, contain or obstruct FBI investigation of Watergate matter. COMMENTS: In general, since the outset of the Watergate investigation, numerous public allegations have appeared suggesting the possibility that the investigation was impeded by instructions given by Mr. Gray. The major areas of criticism of alleged questionable activities of Mr. Gray are as follows: a. Delay in authorizing interviews of Charles Colson and David Young at the White House and the interview of Kathleen Chenow, London, England. WFO by teletype June 19, 1972, requested authority to interview Charles W. Colson as Hunt had worked for Colson at the White House. A memorandum was prepared during the afternoon of June 19, 1972, recommending this interview but this was not approved by Mr. Gray until the morning of June 22, 1972. The reason for this delay is not known. By teletype dated June 28, 1972, WFO requested to David Young interview Kathleen Chenow, former secretary Apparently at Mr. Gray's instructions, this lead was not immediately covered but was held in abeyance because of "national security considerations." Mr. Gray later advised that Chenow was being brought back to the United States in a military aircraft in company - 41 - of Fred Fielding, Dean's assistant. When interviewed July 3, 1972, in Dean's presence, she furnished little, if any, useful information. Tf onnoonc 1 iVa1t 7 r^GAn nm hnr\ fn waif tn intprvipw Phpnrtw was til A UiV A J V4i V A W%4iWW*A. FT v IrV FT MrAV WW W M ** V ww If ■ ■ because Dean wanted to brief her beforehand. By teletype June 29, 1972, WFO recommended immediate interviews of David Young at the White House; John Mitchell in New York; and SAC, WFO, advised June 30, 1972, that AUSA Silbert stated that USA Titus felt there was some delay on the part of the FBI, referring to the interviews of Young, Chenow and Ogarrio, and the receipt of copies of reports. Thereafter, on the same date, Mr, Felt told Mr. Bates that John Dean of the White House had said to hold off interview of Young until Dean talks to Mr. Gray. Later that day Mr. Felt advised Mr. Bates that it was all right to interview Mitchell and Young and that Young would be (and wasl made available at the White House on Monday. July 3. 1972. r » f T The reason for this delay is not known. ‘3 b. Delays in authorizing interviews in connection with the Dahlberg ■ J** Vi and Ogarrio checks which were funneled through Bernard Barker's bank account in Miami, Florida. On June 28, 1972, authority was granted 1 to interview Manuel Ogarrio concerning the $89, 000 in b' Mexican bank drafts which had been located through a review of subject Barker’s bank account in Miami. However, based on instructions from Mr. Gray, the interviews of Ogarrio and Kenneth Dahlberg were deferred due to • ---1 J Jrl ti T 1 I „ 4 -» national security considerations, it is interesting tu uute umi John Dean testified before the Senate Select Committee that even though CIA had cleared Ogarrio and Dahlberg for FBI interview. Dean called Mr. Gray instructing that the interviews not be conducted at that time. aa a a i wf awttJ Am \tta o 1 «*■« QiTf o nrl Via lirO C mf fif* Vyicai cuitc iui me ugai i jiv miei view wao iatui xei^eiveu anu uv w»o viewed Similarly, Dahlberg was sub- sequently interviewed by the Minneapolis Office on July 6, 1972, based on a memorandum from Mr. Bates to Mr. Bolz July 6, 1972, which AAnfiMtviA/1 Awnl i aoVtuI rttl Arte t*Q A A iTTA/ 4 Ur rirott A Q Cot fA1*fVl 1¥1 eviuu uieu viai xuovi uwvivuo iv,vt*vcu n vui • vi* mw v** *** Item #14 of this memorandum, it is still not clear why we were delayed c. Concessions to Dean: 1. Allowing Dean to sit in on our interviews of White House personnel. 0 . TSStrtiichinflr fioan nnni A <5 nf mir inuAfltlo’atiVft H » A. U1 1^# WW &A V VA V T w reports and other communications. 3. Clearing with Dean certain aspects of intended investigation including projected leads at the White House and CRP. Mr. Gray’s decision to allow John Dean to sit in on inter views with all White House personnel obviously had a deleterious effect on the investigation of White House personnel. From the investigative - 43 - 1 I standpoint, having Dean present at interviews undoubtedly had the effect of limiting the furnishing of pertinent information to our agents. Although eventually all the interviews the field desired to cover were handled with the exception of the interview of a covert CIA employee as set out else- where in this memorandum, delays were encountered in conducting some pertinent interviews. The exact reasons for these delays and the effect on the overall investigation are not known but have been the subject of much speculation. In considering the possible impediments to obtaining the full facts of the Watergate case, the furnishing of numerous FBI reports and other communications by Mr. Gray to Dean must be con- sidered. The facts concerning this development first became known February 5, 1973. Up to that time, apparently no one outside of Mr. Gray's staff had any knowledge of what had transpired. There is no evidence in the files indicating this action by Mr. Gray impeded our investigation; however, it must be recognized that access by Dean to our investigative reports would logically indicate to him what information had been developed which would enable him to work out strategy to cover up the case. Similarly, Mr. Gray's concession to clear White House investigation with Dean prior to it being conducted would give Dean time to set the stage in order that the results of that investigation would be more favorable to Dean's ultimate ends. , K t - F -44- -»-• -t 1 •;.**» V •'• ■ 4* V 4 , W-A 11. Alleged leaks of Watergate investigative results to news media. Congress or other unauthorized parties by Bureau personnel. COMMENTS: Allegations of leaks from the FBI concerning the Watergate investigation began in the first week of our investigation and continue to the present time. Although there has been much speculation concerning the source of these leaks, hard facts pinning down these sources have not as yet come to light. It is recalled that on Saturday, June 24, 1972, Mr. Gray had SAC Kunkel and all the WFO Special Agents working on the DNCH break-in into his office at which time he castigated the agents severely concerning the alleged leaks of information. Newspaper stories attributed to sources continued to erupt and during the following week, at Mr. Gray’s instructions, the Inspection staff interviewed 29 WFO employees; seven General Investigative Division employees; six Laboratory Division employees; and three Identification Division employees, with negative results, in an effort to determine whether Bureau personnel were responsible for these leaks. i 1 Ml * » m uctoDer, iy iz, ine wasnmgton .post’ reporters Bernstein and Woodward wrote numerous articles dealing with Segretti’s 1 1 1 j i _ j* . i activities. in connection wun uiese articles, oernstem attempted to interview SA Angelo Lano, WFO case agent. SA Lano refused to offer any comment and Bernstein stated that although he could not name his - 47 - ) source, he could furnish Lano with a ’’good clue.” Thereafter, with the approval of then Assistant Director Bates, Lano met with Bernstein on a street in Washington, D. C. , for the specific purpose of having Bernstein identify his source. This effort proved unproductive and SA Lano terminated the conversation. Later, on October 23, 1972, Bernstein and Woodward were in the process of writing a somewhat explosive story which raised the name of H. R. Haldeman as being involved in the so-called secret fund of cash maintained at CRP. Bernstein telephonically contacted SA Lano late in the evening in an effort to get confirmation of Haldeman’s alleged involvement and SA Lano declined to furnish Bernstein information. The following day, after this article was printed, Bernstein and Woodward saw SA Lano in U. S. District Court and in a somewhat agitated state, informed SA Lano they were under pressure to identify their source and they would have to name SA Lano as the source of the story involving Haldeman. SA Lano categorically denied this allegation to these reporters and on October 26, 1972, furnished the Bureau a lengthy sworn affidavit outlining the whole matter. We wrote the Attorney General a letter dated October 26, 1972, concerning this matter. The matter of leaking information cannot be completely dismissed when it comes to Congress. It is noted that in connection with his confirmation hearings, Mr. Gray on occasion instructed that - 48 - proposed questions and answers about various matters be prepared which could be furnished to selected friendly Republican Senators. In J-L. * M ~ _3 l . — . ~ i j uus regitru, quest iuiio wiiiun were prepared relative t u rsuiiam oegietti, as contained in a memorandum dated March 5, 1973, apparently were furnished to Senator Gurney who asked Mr. Gray a number of questions concerning the matter on the afternoon of March 7, 1973, before the Con afo Tn/4i niofitr Pavw *v\ t44oo uciiatc ti uuiviai y v^utummuc* Beginning in the late Spring of 1973, a number of newspaper articles were written by New York Times reporter John Crewdson, which appeared to indicate Crewdson had access to FBI memo- ronrlo on^ intorviotu T'onAi'to 4 MUVUV (U1U UIVV4 ¥ JLV ¥¥ A IrO* 'l'kic nrtooiVklo 1 oolr koe Kann on i» on oW Kir fKa A 11 ALJ pv/OOAUAU iv^uav UUtJ MV/UU ^vu k-7 UV/U UJf VLIV Inspection and Intelligence Divisions, rather than the Watergate Unit. In view of this, the Watergate Unit defers to the other two Divisions who apparently have the facts. i nfnrm^Hnn JLA M -V 4b 444 fc-V V A\/ A A regarding this matter. In connection with Item #11, pertaining to alleged leaks of Watergate investigation results to news media, Congress, or other un- authorized parties by FBI personnel, the General Investigative Division referred to a number of newspaper articles written by New York Times reporter John Crewdson commencing in the late Spring of 1973, which appeared to indicate Crewdson had access to FBI memoranda and interview *■' t reports. The General Investigative Division pointed out this possible leak had been pursued by the Inspection and Intelligence Divisions and accordingly deferred a response to these respective Divisions. In response, the Intelligence Division did do some research in this matter, reviewing and comparing newspaper articles with Bureau files. The results of this review were turned over to the Inspection Division (orally only). On July 23, 1973, Director Kelley advised Assistant Prosecutor Archibald Cox to the effect that employees of his staff, during the course of interview of a subject of the Watergate investigation, namely Donald Segretti, had informed his people that John Crewdson, y*r o v* fVia XTatit lUpUllCl 1 V 1 U 1 C 1 WW VAvb Tim ac ko ^ xvi iv x uuuo j nau frt ui^piaj uu w kv_ . mm o a fr\r\¥ —Vi i ffli stack of FBI documents, one of which was an FBI original. Furthermore, according to Cox, Segretti identified some of these documents to his staff. Mr. Kelley instructed that an investigation be made concerning thts mat+At* nf rrotuH crm rpnnrtpHIv hsivincr PntrP fn thP ]TRT finH this ifl VttXW V4 V4 V ff \AWI4 4 WjtfV4 V V* V VIA V* V W -a. m—v ■ *1* an ongoing inquiry with the Inspection Division reporting directly to the Associate Director and Director. Interviews are still being conducted on instructions of the Director. This inquiry continues on a highly selective "need -to -know" basis*" Accordingly* the results of our investigation to date cannot be commented on at this time. - 50 - 12. Failure to interview or inadequacy of interview with certain 90 White House officials (Haldeman, Colson, Chapin, et cetera). COMMENTS: In view of the extensive disclosures of the cover up of the Watergate break-in, it is easy to see why an individual not know- ledgeable of investigative procedures might think that the FBI's investi- gation was inadequate since H. R. Haldeman was not interviewed. However, the fact is that his name never arose as being an individual who may have been involved in the break-in conspiracy or who would have information. Accordingly, he was not interviewed. It must be borne in mind that while Halde man’s name is world famous now, during the Summer of 1972 he enjoyed considerably less fame albeit considerably more power. In regard to our investigation involving the White House, it is perhaps germane to consider a telephone conversation of July 19, 1972, between then Assistant Director Bates and Assistant Attorney General Petersen at which time WFO desired to interview John Ehrlichman The interview of Ehrlichman was made obvious since Hunt and Liddy had worked under the general overall supervision of Ehrlichman while they were employed at the White House. Petersen told Bates that he could not see any objection to an interview of Ehrlichman but that he wanted to be sure that the FBI was not conducting a fishing expedition by interviewing pooplc sit the White House * Petersen ws.s assured that we were con- ducting only logical interviews. This, of course, is basic FBI investi- gative policy and an important function of the FBI supervisory staff is to make certain that useless, unproductive, fishing -type leads are not set forth in investigations. It is noted that the Bureau has been criticized for apparent failure to extract the truth from various oeoole we interviewed such as Colson, Chapin, Strachan, Magruder and others but the fact of the matter is that when the cover up fell apart, the entire world learned that these men were coached to lie and their testimony was rehearsed in advance. They are now being prosecuted for their false stories. It is believed that claims of inadequacy of our investigation are without merit. s : I 10 ill _ . . _ t _ X * ili X_ _ * X _JP T —X * _ — _ /f I _i*t* Aiiegea activities on pan oi uepartment 01 justice umciais to limit, contain, or obstruct FBI investigation (Kleindienst, Petersen, rt« 11 . x _ x . _x _ \ 5 1 Diioen, etcetera;. — COMMENTS: While there has been much testimony and discussion as OPE’s source references show, we are in possession of only slight indications that Department of Justice officials limited, contained or obstructed our investigation of the Watergate break-in and conspiracy. Assistant Attorney General Petersen, as detailed in Item #9 above, did not request us to pursue Segretti's activities during 1972; however, in no way does this appear to have hampered our efforts. In fact, to have called for a massive FBI investigation of political harassment in the absence of clear-cut criminal allegations would have subjected the Department and the Bureau to extensive, and probably justified, criticism for interfering with the national elections. An area of justifiable criticism of the Department involves the situation testified to by Kleindienst before the Senate Select Committee J on August 7, 1973, that on the day of the arrests of the five initial subjects, ?■ June 17, 1972, Liddy (in the company of Powell Moore, CRP press ( relations man) contacted Kleindienst at Burning Tree Country Club. Liddy stated that Mitchell asked Liddy to contact Kleindienst concerning the break-in at DNCH. Liddy reported that some of the persons who were arrested might be employed by either the White House or CRP. Kleindienst - 53 - ■> testified that he had such a relationship with Mitchell that he did not believe Mitchell would have sent a person like Liddy to come out and talk to Kleindienst about anything. While Kleindienst further testified he immediate!; called Assistant Attorney General Petersen instructing that those arrested should be given no treatment different than anybody who might have been arrested in similar circumstances, such a general statement clearly did not put Petersen, the prosecutors or the FBI on notice of the apparent involvement of Liddy, Mitchell and unnamed other individuals from the White House and CRP. The FBI was not aware of Liddy’s contact with Kleindienst until the above testimony over one year later. Powell Moore, when interviewed July 24, 1972, made no mention of this meeting. In spite of the foregoing, Petersen and Kleindienst said they had no evidence of high official involvement in the Watergate affair until the early morning hours of April 15, 1973, when they met with the Federal prosecutors who in turn had just learned of it from John Dean and Jeb Stuart Magruder. Ti * _ ii x x — i jf ii * xt_ xi ♦ "f rn j; X « is aiiiicuit noi to una iaun wiui me iauure ui rueinaienst to immediately advise the Bureau of Liddy’s contact with him which occurred just a few hours after the DNCH break-in. Had he done so, there is no doubt our investigative direction at CRP would have been vastly different. First, We WOUlu nut ha.Ve had to COndUci an exhaustive iuY'eSiigatiOn to identify Liddy as we had to do. Secondly, it is easy to speculate that the -54 > successful cover up would have never gotten off the ground since we would have had reason to zero in on Mitchell and Liddy rather than to waste our time checking into McCord’s security set-up and security co-workers at CRP. That investigation did not lead to involvement of any other security people and in effect, was a waste of time. A number of individuals, namely Stans, Krogh, Colson, Chapin, Young and Strachan, were deposed rather than called before the grand jury. Petersen testified that Stans was given special consideration in that his testimony was taken outside the grand jury. Petersen defended the move as proper, if not customary, saying it was done to ’’avoid publicity. " In the minds of some people, this may be obstructive of the grand jury’s investigation. However, it is quite speculative and it is doubtiui ii the taking ot depositions as opposed to tne taking ot testi- mony before the grand jury materially altered the results of the investi gation. In July, 1972, interviews of Jeb Magruder and Bart i.1. _ H _ i _ sorter were requested, un tne tate afternoon _ P Y..1 4 FT M A no oi jury n, iy 72 then Assistant Director Bates received a call from Assistant Attorney General Petersen who advised that CRP attorneys Parkinson and O’Brien had called him regarding the FBI’s desire to interview Porter and Magruder. These attorneys asked to talk to Petersen on July 18, 1972, concerning this and Petersen told Bates that while he had no intention of holding up - 55 - f &?- t: It- u ■s"’ any interviews, he did feel he should talk to these attorneys prior to the interviews. On the afternoon of July 18, 1972, Petersen again contacted Bates telephonically, advised that the attorneys had canceled the meeting and we should proceed with the interviews as we desired. Both these individuals were thereafter interviewed, at which time they lied most convincingly. It is not known whether the slight delay in the interviews it. nn a *w V. n n w> tt4-W * m. rm i- J A v*r«4U tk n « jm 4-/S. /S. j— t ui uicae men n r . jr v .v. 1 $ - 56 - 14. Alleged attempt by CIA officials to interfere, contain or impede FBI Watergate investigation. COMMENTS: One of the recurring themes orchestrated by Senator Baker of the Ervin Committee is that the DNCH break-in was a CIA operation. This is an intriguing theory but the fact remains that during the course of the investigation we did not develop evidence to indicate that CIA and/or its officials were involved in the planning or execution of the Watergate incident. We quickly suspected involvement by CIA as: 1) the cast of characters directly and indirectly involved in the Watergate included a number of former CIA employees or persons who at one time were of interest to that agency; 2) Hunt and Liddy contacted a number of CIA retirees to try to recruit them for intelligence gathering; 3) there were several CIA people whose names were in Hunt’s telephone book; and 4) personnel we contacted at CIA appeared considerably less than responsive and candid in their replies to our inquiries. Specifically, the guarded information we received in response to name checks was about as informative as were the daily newspapers; the incredible backing and filling for about two weeks in late June and early July, 1972, concerning our efforts to determine if FBI interview of Ogarrio and Dahlberg would disrupt any CIA operation certainly was suspicious. We, of course, had no knowledge at that time - 57 - r? C- L fc - ' ( t ' P' >- ' L [ ! \ !: * l of the discussions held at the White House by the President, Ehriichman, Dean, General Walters and Mr. Gray relative to possibly having CIA pay salaries for those arrested. We also did not know of the apparent efforts by the White House to use CIA to steer us away from investi- gating the Ogarrio bank drafts. Although there was extensive testimony about these activities before the Ervin Committee, we still do not know the precise rationale for that effort. As noted earlier, the interviews of Ogarrio and Dahlberg took place on July 6, 1972, and delays in these interviews actually did not appear to alter the ultimate outcome of the Watergate investigation. However, at the time we were seeking to interview these men, we thought there was a good possibility they were involved in the DNCH break-in conspiracy. Other delays encountered in the early stages of this investigation with regard to the interviews of individuals presently or previously affiliated with CIA are as follows: should not be interviewed. The Field was so instructed; however, prior to the receipt of that information, been interviewed resulting - 58 - in no information of value to interview him is now known. At the time that WPO discovered the never interviewed and nn reason /L\ V / On Julv 7. 1972. WFO advised that thei Alexandria was instructed to conduct appropriate investigation regarding o develop his identity and association with Hunt and other subjects. On July 11, 1972, our Alexandria Office advised that CIA would furnish information concerningfljflflj^HLnly to Acting Director Gray. On July 28, 1972 a handwritten note was personally delivered by General Walters to Gray , c a? who was in contact with Hunt during August, 1971. General Walters also supplied a Uher recorder pursuant to Hunt’s request; helped him get it in shape for overt, not covert, use; and there was no attempt to make the recorder useful for clandestine activities. Aside from the above contact regarding the recorders, there were contacts with Hunt by CIA regarding false documents and disguise for himself and an associate. CIA also loaned him a clandestine camera which was returned. CIA also developed a roll of film for Hunt of which it had copies showing some unidentifiable place. Mr. Gray instructed that in view of the contents of the note, no further investigation was to be conducted. 1 This CIA assistance rendered to Hunt we believe had nothing to do with the Watergate matter. Rather, it appears to have been related to Hunt's activities while attached to the Plumbers Operation in the White House and is related to the break-in at the office of Dr. Fielding in September, 1971. (The Ellsberg case. ) We do not know the full scenario among the President and Messrs. Ehrlichman, Haldeman, Dean, Helms, Walters, Gray and possibly others; therefore, there is no way to evaluate the total effect, if any, of their actions and those of CIA on the results of our investi- gation. - 60 - ( "*s 15. Alleged activities on part of White House officials to limit, contain or obstruct FBI Watergate investigation (Dean, Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Colson, et cetera). 33 COMMENTS: There is absolutely no question but that the President’s most senior associates at the White House conspired with great success for nine months to obstruct our investigation. It was a matter of common knowledge during the early weeks of the investigation that the FBI was receiving only lip service cooperation from White House officials such as Dean. Special Prosecutor Jaworski probably summed up the matter as succinctly as can be done in motions filed June 5, 1974, with the court relative to the pending trial of Mitchell, Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Colson, Strachan, Parkinson, and Mardian. On that occasion Mr. Jaworski attributed the success of die Watergate cover up to high level perjury in the early days of the investigation, charging that lies by Mitchell and Ehrlichman were particularly convincing. Mr. Jaworski, who is know- ledgeable of our investigative activities including our frustrations, noted it was "quite natural" for FBI agents who talked to Mitchell and Ehrlichman to "assume that men of their stature would have no involvement" in the criminal activities under investigation and would be eager to tell the truth in the interest of justice. It is also noted that in his testimony of July 11, 1973, before the Ervin Committee, Mitchell, in a colloquy with Senator Weicker, - 61 - described his motives and actions during the Watergate investigation in part as follows: "... I certainly was not about to do anything that would provide for the disclosure of it" (referring to the so-called "White House horrors," i. e. , the Plumbers activities involving Hunt, Liddy and others, which he feared would be exposed by our investigation. ) Messrs. Bates, Felt and Kunkel, when queried by the Inspection Staff in June, 1973, about the matter of White House involve- ment in the cover up, advised there were a number of discussions with Mr. Gray during the early investigation at which time concern over the lack of complete cooperation at the White House and CRP was voiced. Mr. Felt particularly mentioned that on a number of occasions he recommended to Mr. Gray that the President be urged to get the whole case out in the open; however, Mr. Gray told Mr. Felt he did not think an approach to the President was the proper course to pursue. OBSERVATIONS: It appears in light of the foregoing that the dogged determination of the Special Agents who investigated and supervised this case accomplished absolutely all that could be accomplished in the face of an extremely difficult situation and with many of the high cards stacked against them. It is also of outstanding significance that the Special Prosecutor has virtually totally relied upon the same FBI investi- gative and supervisory staff who conducted the original Watergate investi- gation to handle investigations relative to the cover up. - 62 - GENERAL COMMENTS AND OBSERVATIONS BY THE GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION It is noted that virtually none of the above criticisms is new and comments and explanations have been submitted by the Watergate Special Matters Unit concerning most, if not all of these items, several times previously on the following occasions: a. Answers were given to several hundred critical questions by Mr. Gray and his staff from late Summer, 1972, to the end of that year. b. Many of the same questions and criticisms were made by the Senate and the news media in early 1973 during Mr. Gray's confirmation hearings and these were analyzed on/! o ncuroyo/l Kw TTn it IVliW TV V JL V V* MJ Ul^U V/fcAJkV« c. Again when Mr. Ruckelshaus came on the scene in the late Spring, 1973, his staff, particularly Carl Eardley, questioned the handling of these matters and much of the same ground was plowed for Ruckelshaus. d. Subsequently, the Inspection Division analyzed the hunHlinff nf fhA Wntoraata matfpi* snrf AhfuinpH mmin Pnf a. VA V f f Vfr VW VV« A W VV v'lftW and explanations concerning many of the same items. e. Later in the Summer of 1973, the Special Prosecutor's Office requested and was furnished a massive detailing of all FBIHQ instructions issued during the entire investigation of the Democratic National Committee Headquarters DNCH) burglary. OBSERVATIONS: As has been disclosed by the sensational revelations detailing the carefully and skillfully operated cover up, the odds were heavy against us in ever making a case against anyone other than the - 63 - i ; tfi0M^s x mkW^ j* te?! v .-./U.y • j4^dBi5wc**> r» vif -. l ~ !®*8(»r®*llliB§'$ ' ’-• ' y 'A' £ A A. \ ■■& > •,'#.* : ~+ ^ • V* vt*3Sro& > -4*-’ • v - -4 ’> :V-;.!4 •:■> '-*• ,-.i ; - ? . $*?• five arrested subjects. The plain fact is that the performajhi :*Ls'. jm LSrt $ ^yy 7 ’ '■ ^vH agents was admirable. There was tremendous pressure On •ieh n«.y| L' LlTTJO «nt* Cl>r*r>Al #AT TYinntK O CU1U JC UJUI^ pci OUllIt^l AVA U1VUW*U '■ •/ ' *"- v "■ . .•■ • decisions of historic proportions to: 1 ) allow John Dean to sit in J^Aaw*. M.r T T ru i A rt TTA.tnn mA-MHAnM/tl n. *m si 4* ^ Iv A Ikn jrtl 00 V*l*Hli«rV Ullt?i VitJWO ui wiiivv: nuusc uu buimci A O it** AAll 'c* O rtf itTlft AO ( AV /> OaI 1 ^ ViA W A « /T uiu^c i co^aaiuic iui uic uui uau o ai/iivitico iui uici Director Gray) were asked to state the rationale behind Bureau actions in each of the principal areas of criticism. OPE then carefully reviewed the various Bureau actions and rationale behind these actions in com- nnniOAn utifK fVi a nrt«Ati a/Io AT« 4 fi ai om pai iovu w 1x11 me g i uuuuo xvi vi meioui Tl tg aii 1+ aai a iAn fKa Hiirfioii' JLW AO UUA VJ^iniVU 111(41 1 X 11 . J^Ul V<( 4 U i actions, activities and positions in each of the principal areas of criticism were sound and are thoroughly defensible within the scope of sound investigative techniques, the prevailing law and well established Department of Tiifitipp cnnsfolinoa anH nn 1 ir»v V* V V U'lAU J ■ Thtfn*!* ore hnwfWAi* ppntain of fhoGA A Vr UkA V* y liv ¥f V f | V V'A VA M* v W areas where the Bureau's actions are less defensible than others. OPE perceives these areas to be as follows: a. The actions and activities of former Acting Director L. Patrick Gray HL. b. The possibility of information having been leaked from FBI personnel. c. The alleged failure to detect an electronic ”bug" in the Democratic National Committee Headquarters while conducting a search for such devices. The actions and activities of Mr. Gray concerning the Watergate matters have been thoroughly examined within the Bureau and a full accounting has been furnished to the Special Prosecutor’s Office. The commentary submitted by the General Investigative Division in Section IV, Item #10 supra, fully explores the ramifications of Mr. Gray’s actions and OPE concurs in this evaluation. Since Mr. Gray’s activities were completely self -initiated and in view of the fact that his actions are now being scrutinized by the Special Pro- secutor and a Federal grand jury it does not seem to be either necessary or prudent to further pursue this matter at this time. In the area of the possible leaks of information about Watergate matters, there is no doubt that certain information was leaked by Bureau personnel. The Inspection Division is conducting an inquiry into this matter and therefore OPE did not further pursue this particular aspect. The criticism regarding the alleged failure to detect and remove an electronic ”bug" from one of the telephones in the Democratic National Committee Headquarters is more difficult to deal with. In addition to the Democratic National Committee Headquarters officials and the news media. Acting U. S. Attorney Earl Silbert and Assistant - 69 - U. S. Attorney General Henry Petersen have both stated that the FBI missed the bug while conducting the search of the Democratic National Committee Headquarters on June 29, 1972. The following factors relate to this controversial matter: a. c. d. e. During interview of Alfred C. Baldwin m he admitted to monitoring telephone calls of Spencer Oliver in the Democratic National Committee Headquarters. This monitoring took place up to June 16, 1972. A 4- J’k -4- -5 /\ 4U a ^ i -I n ittam/v a a>] jt\. rvt uic: umc uic live; auujcuLo wcic a ncotcu m me Democratic National Committee Headquarters at the Watergate, three electronic "bugs" and one transceiver were recovered, in their possession, but not on any of the telephones. None of these devices were operating on 118.9 mz. On September 13, 1972, an electronic ,T bug M was Art fk a f nl OrtU a«a a! Cnnn aat* itro' XVUI 1 M UU tUV UX VUYO< 1 n fVi i All Ul 1 Democratic National Committee Headquarters by telephone company employees. This "bug" was inoperative, but when activated it operated within the general range that Baldwin stated he was monitoring. James McCord examined the "bug" taken from tolanhnnp snd c+sfprl whq i/IpttHpqI frn W -LA T V4 h# % W4V^/4*V1AV MftlVi M VMV VV4 M W * W ^ VW the one he placed in that location. WFO conducted an extensive investigation but was unable to establish that any other party had placed this "bug". The Laboratory Division states that its personnel conducted a thorough sweep and the "bug" was not there. The Laboratory Division also points out that Telephone Security personnel conducted a similar search on June 17-18, 1972, and reported that "nothing unusual or out of order was detected. Neither the Laboratory personnel nor the r f \ A w O ■* 4-tt iMA-M/vl 4 a nn(> a n Amvt a^I« /\«t jT*.t AW W%. A icicjjuuiic ocuunty pciouimci uwuc uutco ur auy uinci ui uia-uic- scene record of the extent of the search. Based on the foregoing it is apparent that neither position can be positively proven. Therefore, the only realistic position that i'lv « D»waa«‘i aam. ^aIpa ^ a 4-Ia r\ 4- ^aaUav aa11« aa w> *\ a 4 AW+ Dttw AfM* AA Wi’AWW a1 V A uic DUi cdu ceiu ucu\c 19 umi icumu/au^r uuuipctcui dui cau pci ouuuci nave stated that they searched this location and found no electronic device. It appears fruitless to debate the issue further. A final point should be made at this time: TKot*n ic nA Aimof i nn tKot nortoin n a+o orvH Arv> icc TAn o aaw- muiv 10 nu v|u^ovivu uxu l tarn a.v tu uuu v/tiii^uAv/uur uoui - mitted by high Administration officials had a dilatory effect on certain aspects of the FBI’s investigation. However, there has been no indication of other than a professional, diligent and tenacious investigative endeavor rm fV»a niirf nf Ptnromi nor.Qnnriol This nnint \x/qc hmiurhi 1 linmp flnrinor VIA VIA V* V VA MS V VA* V%. ^ V i-UAV Al AM T ▼ V -A >r v 1AV the Senate confirmation hearing of former Acting Director Ruckelshaus to be Deputy Attorney General on September 12, 1973. Mr. Ruckelshaus stated that during his tenure as Acting Director ”His efforts involved (1) reviewing the entire Watergate investigation by the FBI up to that point, (2) responding to requests from the grand jury through the pro- secutors to pursue particular leads, and (3) following up a variety of allegations in the media of impropriety or inadequacy in the FBI's C r * V.-jv,- r < handline of the Watereate inve stiff at ion. All memoranda, loes. documents. 2 ’ W 7 and records developed in all of those activities have been turned over v.w - 71 - 1 ) to the Special Prosecutor, who has been charged with the entire responsibility for investigating the Watergate matter, including allegations concerning the adequacy of the original investigation by the FBI. ” 25 Ruckelshaus further advised the Committee M I have no information in terms of the Watergate break-in that the FBI did anything other than act in a totally professional manner, in terms of following out any leads or any interviews or doing any investigation they were asked to do. This is one of the things that got the FBI agents themselves involved in some distress because they feel that they’ve done a very good • . * * jod in wnat tney were supposed to oe doing, rney acted very proiessionaiiy, And I think they’re right. I think they did. /\r\n i a xt_ _ 11 _ i i * uaseu on me ioregoing iacis, aiso Deneves mat uie FBI has no cause to be chagrined by its total effort in the Watergate rnu « T?nTt» - xi_ ^ t_ * i __ j _ ^ i j umuci B. x iit? rox s iictuuimg ui uiest? cases can uts sirungiy ueieauea. - 72 - APPENDIX A ) f CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT tir A mnnun A rn tt> W A i &XWJA 1 Hi nrix a nnr*t\ niiLini HfXJ mrr'vnnci JCi V XliJS ± O October 1, 1971 James W. McCord, Jr. , former FBI agent and retired CIA official, begins part-time consulting work for the Committee for the Re-Election of the President (CRP). December 1, 1971 G. Gordon Liddy leaves his post on the Domestic Council and the White House and becomes counsel for the CRP. January 9, 1972 mwui u ooum ac UOJ UlilVU fk O U 1 V> nn cjif i a! putjjliiv/u ifcSJL ■full fimo Pa _ 1U11 IrllllV UV, iy U1 llrJT W ordinator for CRP with additional duties as Security Coordinator for the Republican National Committee. January 27, 1972 At a meeting in the Attorney General’s Office, U. S. Department of Justice, attended by John N. Mitchell, the Attorney General; Jph Stuart MaorriiH^r thp Artirur TlirPi'tnr nf thp fRP* Cl Hrirrinn T.iHrfv w wiv a VA MV'* y ■ "V 4 V V W* wa vaa w V* J "•-* ■ ’*-• v » v» waa j counsel to the CRP; and John W. Dean III, White House Counsel, Liddy presents an intelligence plan which he proposes to be implemented for the CRP. This plan allegedly included both legal and illegal activities including electronic surveillance of various potential political opponents of the President and Democratic Party facilities. This plan was estimated by Liddy to cost approximately one million dollars and according to the testimony of both Dean and Mitchell, Mitchell turned the plan down directing that a more realistic Dlan be devised. February 4, 1972 Mitchell, Dean, Liddy and Magruder again meet in the Attorney General's Office and discuss a revised intelligence proposal pre- pared by Liddy which is estimated to cost approximately one-half million dollars and emphasizes electronic surveillance. Mitchell is reported to have again declined to approve this particular plan. - 73 - March 1, 1972 John N. Mitchell leaves his post as Attorney General and becomes Director of the CRP. March 22, 1972 George Gordon Liddy, after reported conflicts with Jeb Magruder, leaves his post as counsel to the CRP and assumes the post as counsel to the Financial CRP. March 30, 1972 Another meeting is held to discuss intelligence plans for CRP as developed by Liddy. This meeting is held in Key Biscayne, Florida and is attended by John Mitchell, Frederick C. LaRue (a former White House aide who at that time held the position of assistant to Mitchell at the CRP), and Jeb Magruder. Magruder has testified that at this meeting Mitchell approved the intelligence plan which included wiretapping and authorized a budget of $250, 000 for these projects. Mitchell has denied that he authorized the plan and LaRue has been ambiguous in his state- ments concerning whether or not the plan was authorized. April 7, 1972 The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 became effective on this date. This Act, in addition to amending certain sections of the Criminal Code relating to Election Laws, broadened the reporting require- uiciilo regulating r cuci U1VV 11V/UUV C4I1U tliv, 1UV 1UU1VUVVU 11V UUM WVil VV4 MJ WAV- tin UV House as of July 1971. Immediately thereafter agents proceeded to Hunt’s residence in Potomac, Maryland, and attempted to interview him. But he refused to discuss the case other than acknowledging that the check found by the agents was in fact his. June 17, 1972 G. Gordon Liddy and Powell A* Moore, an official of CRP, contacted Attorney General Richard G. Kleindienst at the Burning Tree Golf Club. Liddy advised Kleindienst that Mitchell had asked him to contact Kleindienst concerning the break-in at the Democratic National Committee Headquarters. Liddy stated that some of the persons who were arrested might be employed by either the White House or the CRP and wanted to see if Kleindienst could effect their release. Kleindienst has stated that he promptly dismissed these men and immediately there- after contacted Assistant Attorney General Henrv Petersen and instructed _ - - mt ~ that those arrested at the Democratic National Committee Headquarters should receive no different treatment than any other person arrested in a similar circumstance. • '\5SrC . June 18, 1972 Continuing investigation by WFO agents and the Metropolitan Police Department resulted in the identification of the five arrested subjects and determination that McCord and Barker had CIA ties. June 19, 1972 Assistant United States Attorney Earl Silbert of the District of Columbia advised that he was assuming prosecutive jurisdiction of this case upon specific instructions of the Justice Department and the United States Attorney. He advised that the Department wanted an intensive, thorough investigation regarding the five arrested subjects and any other persons who might be involved in view of the apparent violation of the Interception of Communications Statutes. June 19, 1972 Information was received that a room in the Howard Johnson Motel immediately across the street from the Watergate Office complex had been utilized by James McCord and others. Investigation determined that James McCord had rented a room in this motel in the name of McCord Associates. Telephone toll calls made from this room led Bureau agents to the identification of Alfred C. Baldwin ni and a determination that he is a former Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Baldwin was identified by personnel of the motel as a person they had seen fre- quently in the room rented by McCord. T...» * A duuc iv i nrro 157 16 According to testimony he gave at a later date before the Senate Watergate Committee, John W. Dean m stated that on this date A»» oiVilxr fVi/i /In vt t«n 1- nl /I A w/\tr 1^1 aim 4-V* n I* ui puoQiui) wic xviiv/ w uig uajf uu tuiu mtt/i nc) vjciici ai ivicmuicuoi uiai "this matter could lead directly to the White House." Assistant Attorney General Petersen was called in and advised of the same information. Dean further stated that he got the impression that Petersen "realized rvt»AV\l O n ti7? r ? a nnnn i nirn inrnf i Art nf fVi a a U ai i a w*v UWXVUIO CL w IUV Vpcu J. 11 V U 1 UiC TV II 11 C 11 UUO wt 5 nrV> + n«Aof A uiiguv hi catc in an election year. " June 21, 1972 John D. Ehrlichman, Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs, contacted L. Patrick Gray HI, Acting Director of the FBI, and instructed Gray to deal directly with John W. Dean IE on Watergate matter investigations concerning any White House activities or personnel. June 22, 1972 John Dean, White House Counsel, informed Acting Director Gray that he would sit in on all FBI interviews of White House personnel. June 22, 1972 WFO agents interview Charles Colson, Special Counsel to the President, in the presence of John Dean. During the interview Colson stated he believed that E. Howard Hunt had worked on the third floor of the White House. The interviewing agents asked Mr. Dean if they could accompany Dean to Hunt's office to determine if Hunt had left anything there. Dean indicated that this was the first that he was aware of this office and that the White House would provide the FBI with any contents belonging to Hunt. June 23, 1972 Acting Director Gray meets with John Dean and indicates that he will hold off authorizing Bureau agents interviewing Manuel Ogarrio, a Mexican attorney through whose bank account funds had been funneled to the Barker group who took part in the Watergate burglary. Gray states that this was done at Dean’s request that the Bureau not expose CIA sources in connection with the movement of funds connected to the CRP through Mexican channels. June 26, 1972 On two separate occasions during this day John Dean and his assistant, Fred Fielding, gave WFO agents two boxes containing material and personal effects from E. Howard Hunt’s office in the White House. June 28, 1972 Acting Director Gray contacts John Dean and advises him that he has scheduled a meeting with CIA Director Helms in order to straighten out the Mexican money channel to determine if there is any CIA involvement so that Bureau agents may proceed with logical investi- gation in this area. Gray states that Ehrlichman called him that same date and told him to cancel the meeting because it wasn't necessary. Gray stated that he complied with this request. June 28, 1972 y. Acting Director Gray meets with John Dean and John Ehrlichman in Ehrlichman’s White House office. At this time Dean gives to Gray two files which he states came from Howard Hunt’s safe, According to later testimony of Mr. Gray, Dean stated that these two files contained "political dynamite" and "should never see the light of day." June 29, 1972 On this day and the following day technically trained agents ■X-Ia T7^T3 V T ihVl a m a A a A ma m a Jm I a a « « «• * a * « ■■ ~u ■ a Jf a a aa a a a aa a XI & ui uic r di ijtiuui niury cuiiijjiettru security survey ui uie ijeiiiucrsiLic National Committee Headquarters and the Watergate Office Building with negative results. No additional electronic surveillance equipment was located during the survey. July 6, 1972 Acting Director Gray met with General Walters, Deputy of fho PTA of whir»K time \X7 q 1 fore rlnliimrarl o momot*on/1iini u.v ixj-vii nuiv tv u r va vu u uivuiv/ji miuuiu stating that the CIA had no interest in Ogarrio or Dahlberg. Gray states that after receiving this memorandum he ordered the interviews of Ogarrio and Dahlberg to be conducted. Gray further states that on this Ha v hp was pnnfa/^fprf hv fhp PrpeiHonf on o cona rafp moffor Vmf fr^rVlr flip ** W 1? ^ V V A* VVA xy V V» Vi V J VI A V A A W W AVIV AAir VIA “ “ 111 Mr V w A. occasion to warn the President of his concern about the Watergate investigation. Gray stated that he told the President that he and General Walters felt that people on the President’s staff were trying to mortally wound the President by using the CIA End FBI End by confusing the question of CIA interest in, or not in, people the FBI wished to interview. Gray stated that the President advised him to continue to conduct an aggressive and thorough investigation. July 10, 1972 Alfred C. Baldwin in made a statement to Bureau agents and Assistant U. S. Attorneys implicating himself in the monitoring of electronically intercepted telephone conversations on the telephone of Spencer Oliver in the Democratic National Headquarters at the Watergate Building. Baldwin indicated he was working directly for James McCord and had also had direct contact with E. Howard Hunt and G. Gordon Liddy during the course of the electronic interception and break-in at Democratic National Committee Headquarters. Baldwin indicated that both Hunt and - 79 - T l/l/lrr iVrfit'Q Art fV» C/tAna -i rt fVt A ltVimA/4th4-A Tfinirtiftt r\t 4-krt kt»A*iV_in JJJ.UUJT WC1 t UU LLlb QiyQllC All U1V V It Ulivj \JX. Lll^ U1 COIV-Ul on June 17, 1972, but both had escaped detection at that point. Baldwin’s statement provided the first direct proof of the involve- ment of Hunt and Liddy in the Watergate break-in and wiretapping. July 21, 1972 Acting Director Gray starts sending FBI file material inAlii/finrr intowi ow t*orwt*f o frv TnKn flfion of f Vi a U/Viito Uauca UlV/iUUUlg X JL/ WU UJltVA T IV IT I. VU W U VlAX X/V(U1 (XV VUV ““ w XX XV V- XXVUMV without clearing the reports through the Attorney General. On the prior day Dwight Dalbey, Assistant Director, Office of Legal Counsel, had submitted a memorandum to Mr. Gray indicating that FBI records are in the custody of the Attorney General and technically may not be released from the Department without his consent. Dalbey stated that the authority and obligation of the FBI are to keep the Attorney General informed and what ever other action the Attorney General decided would ’refit \inth him A V w TV Mil September 7, 1972 Mr. Lawrence O’Brien, Chairman of the Democratic National Committee, states that he has evidence that his personal office telephone was tapped for several weeks before the June 17, 1972, break-in. He states that his office was broken in during May 1972 and indicated that he was a victim of a Republican sponsored invasion. September 13, 1972 On this date an electronic device was found on the telephone of Spencer Oliver in the Democratic National Committee Headquarters in the Watergate Office Building. This electronic device was found by telephone company security employees after a complaint by personnel of the Democratic National Committee. WFO agents and FBI Laboratorv W mr personnel launched an investigation into this additional wiretapping equipment. September 15, 1972 A Federal Grand Jury in Washington, D. C. , returns a multi- count indictment against the five subjects found inside the Democratic National Committee Headquarters at Watergate and additionally charges E. Howard Hunt and G. Gordon Liddy with Conspiracy, Interception of Communications and Burglary. After the return of the indictments J. W. - 80 - } Hushen, Director of Public Information at the Justice Department, makes a public statement that the indictments have ended the investi- gation and "we have absolutely no evidence to indicate that any others should be charged. ” (It should be noted that at this time both the WFO and the Federal Grand Jury were still working on numerous out- standing investigative matters and there was no indication that the Bureau’s investigation was to cease at this point. ) September 16, 1972 Attorney General Kleindienst issues a statement setting forth that the investigation by the FBI and USA’s Office in the District of Columbia is one of the most intensive, objective and thorough investi- gations that has been undertaken by the Justice Department in several years. Assistant Attorney General Petersen also issues a statement saying that allegations that a whitewash has been involved in the investi- gation are completely untrue. Petersen issued statistics indicating that 333 agents from 51 field offices have worked 1,897 leads, conducted 1, 551 interviews and expended 14, 098 man hours in conducting this investigation and in addition the Federal Grand Jury has met for a total of 125 hours and examined 50 witnesses. December 7, 1972 In newspaper accounts Kathleen Chenow, a White House secretary, confirms the existence of a ’’Plumbers Unit” in the White House as an internal investigative unit. She stated that its members were David R. Young, G. Gordon Liddy, E. Howard Hunt, and Egil CVl A ft 4- im if lMTr/vnfiiVO •tvrugi** uuc oiaito uuu utc uim waa mvcoLi^aiiug iuaxvo iu uic uuwo media. December 8, 1972 In Chicago, Illinois, a United Airlines jet crashes killing Dorothy Hunt, the wife of E. Howard Hunt. FBI agents at the scene recover $10,000 in one hundred dollar bills found in the pocket book of Mrs. Hunt. January 8, 1973 In U. S. District Court, Washington, D. C. , before Chief Judge John Sirica the trial of the seven indicted Watergate break-in subjects begins. - 81 - v January 11, 1973 Senator Sam J. Ervin (D-NC) is picked to head a Senate investigation of Watergate related matters in the Presidential election campaign of 1972. January 15, 1973 Four of the Watergate break-in defendants, Barker, Gonzalez, Martinez and Sturgis, enter guilty pleas to all seven counts of the Watergate break-in indictment. E. Howard Hunt has previously on January 11, 1973, plead guilty to all counts of the indictment charging him with complicity in the Watergate break-in and wiretapping matters. January 17, 1973 During the trial of the seven defendants in the Watergate break-in case the court goes into closed session where Alfred Baldwin testified that he monitored approximately 200 conversations on this wiretap and gave daily logs to James McCord. January 30, 1973 In the Federal trial of the remaining Watergate break-in defendants, James McCord and G. Gordon Liddy, the jury returns a guilty verdict on all counts. February 7, 1973 The United States Senate votes to establish a select committee for the investigation of the Presidential election campaign of 1972. The committee is to be composed of four Democratics and three Republicans. February 17, 1973 Mr. L. Patrick Gray HI is nominated by President Nixon to be permanent Director of the FBI. His nomination is sent to the Senate Judiciary Committee for consideration. February 28, 1973 During confirmation hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee Acting Director Gray acknowledges that he has shown John Dean, White House Counsel, FBI files relating to the Watergate Investigation. Mr. Gray also offers to open the FBI investigative files on this investi- gation to Senators who wish to see them. - 82 - 1 March 13, 1973 Mr. Gray supplies the Senate Judiciary Committee with a memorandum showing that he had met with or talked to John Dean on 33 occasions between June and September 1972 relating to the Watergate investigation. Mr. Gray had previously, on March 7, 1973, advised this Committee that he had provided John Dean with 82 FBI investigative reports relating to the Watergate matter. March 19, 1973 Judge John Sirica receives a letter from James McCord charging that he and other Watergate defendants were under political pressure to plead guilty and remain silent. He also intimates that perjury was committed at the trial and that higher-ups were involved in the break- in and that there is a cover up of the entire Watergate investigation being conducted. March 20, 1973 Acting Director Gray informed the Senate Judiciary Committee that he had received orders from Attorney General Kleindienst to refuse to answer further questions regarding the FBI’s investigation of the Watergate or other ongoing investigative activities. March 22, 1973 During questioning by Senator Robert C. Byrd (D-W. Va. ), Mr. Gray acknowledges that John Dean probably lied to FBI agents investi- gating the Watergate matter when he told them on June 22, 1972, that he did not know if Hunt had an office in the White House. April 5, 1973 President Nixon withdraws L. Patrick Gray’s nomination to be Director of the FBI. April 27, 1973 L. Patrick Gray resigns as Acting Director of the FBI. Mr. Gray issues a statement indicating that certain serious allegations concerning his actions during the ongoing Watergate investigation are now a matter of public record and as a consequence he would tender his - 83 - immediate resignation as Acting Director of the FBI. There have been previous newspaper accounts indicating that Mr. Gray had received certain documents from the White House safe of E. Howard Hunt directly from John Dean and that he had withheld these files and later destroyed them. April 27, 1973 William D. Ruckelshaus is appointed by President Nixon as Acting Director of the FBI to replace Mr. Gray. Mr. Ruckelshaus states that he does not expect to be in this position longer than two months. A il OA ii ou, * a nr* XV to President Nixon announced the resignation of H. R. Haldeman, White House Chief of Staff; John D. Ehrlichman, Chief Counselor for Domestic Affairs; John W. Dean, Presidential Counsel and Attorney General Kleindienst. At the same time the President announced the nomination of Elliott L. Richardson as Attorney General and General Alexander Haig as the new White House Chief of Staff. The President 1 /l 1 rto j4 fKaf fKrt M AllT A AlT 1 i nh n t~> rv v\ \ it f/m i 1 iJ ItOtr A full inui^auuu uiat uic utw rvtvui acjf ucnci tu ^iviv/ncu uovu; wvjujlu. nav i; iuu charge of the Administration's Watergate investigations and would have authority to appoint a Special Prosecutor in the case. May 17, 1973 The Senate Select Committee on the Investigation of the Presidential Election Campaign of 1972, under the Chairmanship of Rfmafnr TTririn lipcrinc miHl i n houri ncr c *VVllUbVA VWI. + II AJi T JLX £ y UVU1 111^ t (R-Tenn. ) is the Co-Chairman. .^onafnr TTmi;cirH TT Ratpr Jr Iw/VliUVV/Ai J.AV/ TV U.4 VI AA « J LfUXVVA y U * 4 May 18, 1973 Attorney General Designate Elliott Richardson names former Solicitor General Archibald Cox, a Harvard Professor, as Special Prosecutor in the Justice Department to probe and prosecute the Watergate and related investigations. May 22, 1973 Acting Director Ruckelshaus instructed that an analysis be prepared concerning allegations indicating possible involvement of former Acting Director L. Patrick Gray in the cover up or use of action to delay or impede the FBI investigation of the Watergate. This project was assigned to the Insoection Division. A. ... m V A A ^ A M A May 3U, iy u John Ehrlichman, former Assistant to the President, tells a Senate Subcommittee investigating the CIA involvement in the Watergate case and the Pentagon papers that President Nixon was aware of the FBI investigation into Mexican aspects of the break-in within six days after it occurred and had instructed him (Ehrlichman) and Haldeman to have the CIA "curb the FBI probe". June 7, 1973 Acting Director Ruckelshaus submits a document to Archibald Cox, Special Prosecuting Attorney, U. S. Justice Department, setting forth a precise record on the FBI’s activities at the initial stages of the Watergate investigation. This document, which was prepared by the Inspection Division, in conjunction with the Special Watergate Matters Unit of the General Investigative Division, former Assistant Director Charles W. Bates and Acting Associate Director W. Mark Felt, is 26 pages in length and has six memoranda as enclosures which further specify the exact activities which occurred at the outset of the Watergate investi- gation. June 25, 1973 John Dean, former White House Counsel, testified concerning his role in the cover up of the Watergate investigation and the role of several other administration officials. Dean indicated that the President was aware of the cover up as early as September 1972. John Dean's testimony before the Senate Watergate Committee continued for three more days until June 28, 1973. June 26, 1973 The Inspection Division, in conjunction with the General Investigative Division, the Press Services Office and the Office of Legal Counsel, completed its analysis of the possible involvement by L. Patrick Gray in illegal and/or improper activities to impede or delay the FBI's investigation of the Watergate matter. This analysis was furnished to Acting Director Ruckelshaus. (This analysis was also furnished to the Office of the Special Prosecutor on April 10, 1974. ) - 85 - ■w « J A n A July y, ia/3 Mr, Clarence M. Kelley is sworn in as Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation replacing William D, Ruckelshaus. After leaving the FBI as Acting Director, Mr. Ruckelshaus is appointed Deputy Attorney General. July 16, 1973 Alexander P. Butterfield, Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration and a former White House Aide, advised the Senate Watergate Committee that all of President Nixon's conversations in the White House and Executive Office Building were recorded beginning in the Spring of 1971 by concealed microphones and telephone bugs. Butterfield stated that the listening devices were installed under President Nixon's authority for "posterity's sake". October 10, 1973 Vice President Spirio Agnew resigned after pleading nolo contendere to a charge of Federal income tax evasion. Vice President Agnew 's resignation had no connection with the Watergate investigation. October 19, 1973 John W. Dean III enters a guilty plea to one count Conspiracy to Obstruct Justice for his role in the Watergate investigation cover up. In exchange for an agreement to further testify Special Prosecutor Cox granted Dean immunity from prosecution for other Watergate crimes. October 20, 1973 The White House announced that President Nixon had ordered Attorney General Elliott L. Richardson to dismiss Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox; that Richardson had resigned rather than comply with that - 86 - ittV* rt miv; a«> rkT\yJ 4-l-i 4- I A 44 ai«vi ait /^Irvw^ via 1 r\ Dunlrnl^^.ic Ui uci anu lluxl lycpui) miyi ucj ucuciax vv iiuaui u, ivuci\ciouaua ? had also refused the President’s order, had been fired. The White House stated that Solicitor General Robert H. Bork had become the Acting Attorney General and had dismissed Special Prosecutor Cox and dissolved the Office of the Special Prosecutor. November 1, 1973 ir reaiuem XT*^ I’N JLA.U11 w « r, ur:n:««, n JC1WIU1 VV 11J.JUUU J_> OcLAUC ui Aki^ Vliiu to be Attorney General and Leon Jaworski, a Houston attorney, as the new Special Prosecutor. November 5, 1973 In a hearing in U. S. District Court, Washington, D. C. , on a motion to withdraw guilty pleas by five of the original seven Watergate 3 — .4- ~ 4k« c* t\ i. r ~ . i i 4-u^i. UtJltJIlUitULS, it IlltJIIlUtri" Ui Lilt OptJUlili MT iUBtJUUlUI' £> UUIUC I'tVtclItU LIlctL John W. Dean, former White House Counsel, had admitted to destroying two notebooks that had been taken from the White House safe of E. Howard Hunt, two days after the Watergate break-in. Previously Dean had stated that all of the material had either been furnished to FBI agents or to Acting Director Gray. Dean also had not made an admission to retaining and later destroying these notebooks during his testimony before the Senate Watergate Committee. Dean had told the Special Prosecutor’s Office that he found the notebooks while going through WTiite House file materials in January 1973. Dean claimed that the notebooks contained names and addresses of people connected with the Watergate break-in and related crimes. November 21, 1973 I T u- D. White House Special Counsel J. Fred Buzhardt advised District Judge John Sirica that an eighteen and one -half minute section of a White House tape recorded on June 20, 1972, of conversations between President Nixon and his former Chief of Staff, H. R. Haldeman, was blank and contained no audible tones. Judge Sirica ordered the White House to turn the remaining portion of that tape and others that had been subpoenaed over to the court by November 26, 1973. December 20, 1973 House Judiciary Committee Chairman Peter W. Rodino (D-NJ), announced the selection of John M. Doar, former Assistant Attorney General in the Administration of President Kennedy as Special Counsel to the House Judiciary Committee for the purpose of conducting an inquiry into possible impeachment grounds against President Nixon. f\n -O i - February 6, 1974 The House of Representatives, U. S. Congress, votes approval for the House Judiciary Committee to conduct an impeachment investigation and grant powers of subpoena and funds for this inquiry. February 19, 1974 me senate Watergate committee enaea its public nearmgs into the Presidential election campaign practices of 1972. Committee Chairman Sam Ervin stated that it was now up to the House Judiciary Committee and the courts to carry on the Watergate investigations that his Committee had begun. March 1, 1974 A -n* j "l O i “ T T T 1 _ : 3i _ i j a reuera .1 urana jury in wasnmgion, u . c. , maictea seven former officials of the White House or the President’s Re-Election Committee for conspiring to impede the investigation of the Watergate break-in at the Democratic National Headquarters. The seven indicted include former Attorney General John Mitchell, former Presidential Chief of Staff H. R. Haldeman, former Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs John D. Ehrlichman, former Special Counsel to the President Charles W. Colson, former Assistant Attorney General 1— J ^ ^ ff n U •« rt M T -r-W. M M At 4- 4- -M -«% ^ At M A\ MA tAA ^ ^4* ^ 4“ At ^ At4 4lft i\uucri lunuci duurnc}' lur uie ^uuiiiiittcc lu ne-i^itrui uic President Kenneth W. Parkinson and former Assistant to H. R. Haldeman at the White House Gordon Strachan. April 10, 1974 The Bureau forwarded to the Special Prosecutor's Office a letter enclosing 33 documents and/or internal Bureau memoranda dealing wifVi w ita nAOCiVil q irinlotiAwo uj i. v, v luiavicfiLO Af tfi 1 nut vaw Ktr “J fAl*M x.\j i A a! imr nv/vmgj Hi A+AT» JL/ll WW 1 "D ofwi a!t a an lvn Gray III. Included in the enclosures was a June 26, 1973, memorandum from Inspector James J. O'Connor to Mr. Jacobson setting forth the results of the Bureau's internal review regarding possible impedement or obstruction of the Watergate investigation by former Acting Director Gray. April 30, 1974 President Nixon transmits to the House Judiciary Committee and releases to the public 1,308 pages of edited transcripts from re- cordings taken in the White House relating to Watergate matters. The President states that these transcripts will answer all inquiries regarding his activities in relation to the Watergate matter and will provide the public and the House Judiciary Committee with the answer to the basic question at issue "Whether the President personally acted improperly in the Watergate matter?" & & - 89 - AnTinimrir t> *r EjI\uu± o BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF MOST SIGNIFICANT SUBJECTS 1. BERNARD L. BARKER vi One of the five subjects arrested in the Democratic Party National Headquarters, Watergate Office Building, June 17, 1972, Barker is the President of Barker Associates, Inc, , Miami, a real estate firm. He was born in Havana, Jhiba, March 17, 1917, of Americ an parents. He is Barker was uimzea to recruit otner cuDan-Americans to participate in the Water- gate burglaries and his company bank accounts were utilized as a conduit for funds which were utilized in the activities of the Watergate burglars. Prosecutive Action Barker was indicted by a Federal Grand Jury on September 15, 1972, on one count of Interception of Communications and one count of Conspiracy as well as two counts of violation of the District of Columbia Code. On January 15, 1973, Barker plead guilty and on November 9, 1973, he was sentenced to an indefinite term of from 18 months to 6 years in Federal custody. 2 . DWIGHT L. CHAPIN Former Appointments Secretary to President Nixon, Chapin was a close associate of H. R. Haldeman and worked for Haldeman at the J. Walter Thompson Advertising Agency in Los Angeles, California, prior to coming to the White House in 1969. Chapin resigned his post at the White House on February 28, 1973, and returned to the business world. Prosecutive Action On November 29, 1973, Chapin was indicted on four counts of making false statements before a Federal Grand Jury. On April 5, 1974, he was convicted on two counts and was sentenced May 15, 1974, to 10 to 30 months in Federal custody. Chapin is presently free during appeal. a -yu- 3 . /pN V V A UtlAKljUiS W. UUL.SUIV Former Special Counsel to President Nixon from late 1969 until February 1973, Colson was in charge of special projects and liaison with outside groups. He is prominently mentioned in the White House tapes as being a hard-nose trouble-shooter. Colson brought E, Howard Hunt to the White House as a consultant. Colson was questioned several times by Bureau agents during the immediate aftermath of the Watergate burglary and while answering questions was generally extremely guarded in his comments and not fully cooperative. Prosecutive Action On March 1, 1974, Colson was indicted on one count of Conspiracy to Obstruct Justice and one count of Obstruction of Justice in connection with the cover up of the Watergate burglary matters. These charges tttawa PaI c? An nl norl m i i 1 fiT in o TTM 1 cV\dnrT no OQ An Tuna 7 wcic ui upjjcu anti pivau 5un.vj jj* uiv, ^ uu u uuv 1974. Colson was indicted on March 7, 1974, on one count of Conspiracy to violate the civil rights of Dr. Fielding, the psychiatrist to Dr. Ellsberg This charge was also dropped on June 3, 1974, when Colson plead guilty frt ^nafTtar nVi q r*rro fhof nf nhatrnp+inn nf Tnctipp in tha Fllchorcr inUPGfi* W ^ V j M1IAV VA IrA V4V WiVU VA U V4K/WA W JL.JL JL VII V M WA ^ V gation and trial. 4. JOHN W. DEAN m Former Chief Counsel to the President and Deputy Associate Attorney General of the United States, Dean, aged 35, was the President's Counsel from July 1970 until April 30, 1973. Dean was the liaison representative of the White House with the Bureau during the Watergate investigation and received written reports from former Acting Director L. Patrick Gray. In addition Dean sat in all interviews of White House employees conducted by the Bureau. It was alleged and Dean has con- firmed that he withheld certain documents from the safe of E. Howard Hunt located in the White House and later turned over certain of these documents to Mr. Gray for destruction. He also has acknowledged that he himself retained certain of these documents and later destroyed them himself. Dean has been a principal witness against President Nixon and is to date the only individual with first hand knowledge who has accused the President of any illegal activities. In addition to Mr. Gray, Dean also dealt with Assistant Attorney General Henry Petersen and former Attorney General Kleindienst in matters relating to the White House involvement in the Watergate case. - 91 - Prosecutive Action Dean was indicted by a Federal Grand Jury on one count of Conspiracy to Obstruct Justice. On November 30, 1973, he plead guilty to this charge. Sentencing is being held in abeyance. 5. JOHN D. EHRLICHMAN Ehrlichman served as Chief Counsel to the President and later as Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs. Ehrlichman, aged 49, was a classmate of former White House Chief of Staff, H. R. "Bob'’ Haldeman at UCLA in the late 1940’s. Ehrlichman served in President Nixon’s unsuccessful presidential campaign in 1960 and in 1968 Ehrlichman served as the Tour Director for the Nixon campaign. He came to the White House immediately after the inauguration in 1969 as White House Counsel which position he held until being made Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs. Ehrlichman established the in-house investigative unit officially titled ’’The White House Special Investigations Unit, ” later to be known as the "Plumbers”. One of Ehrlichman’s principal assistants on the Domestic Council, Egil Krogh, Jr. , was installed by Ehrlichman as the head of the "Plumbers Unit". Ehrlichman is alleged to have approved the office burglary of Dr. Fielding, the psychiatrist to Daniel Ellsberg. Ehrlichman resigned on April 30, 1973, at the same time that the President fired John Dean and also accepted the resignation of H. R. Haldeman. Prosecutive Action Ehrlichman was indicted by a Federal Grand Jury on March 1, 1974, on one count of Conspiracy to Obstruct Justice, one count of making a false statement to the FBI, two counts of making false statements to a Grand Jury and one count of Obstruction of Justice. Ehrlichman plead not guilty to all counts of the indictment on March 7, 1974. 6. VIRGIL 10 RAMON GONZALEZ One of the five individuals who were arrested inside the Democratic Party National Headquarters at the Watergate Office Building on June 17, 1972. Gonzalez is a locksmith by trade, living and working in the Miami, Florida, area. A native of Cuba and reportedly a former member of the Cuban Secret Service, Gonzalez entered the United States as a permanent resident in 1954 and was naturalized in 1972. It has been alleged that Gonzalez was formerly associated with the CIA but this allegation has been denied by the CIA. - 92 - Prosecutive Action Gonzalez was indicted by a Federal Grand Jury on September 15, 1972, for Conspiracy and Interception of Communications as well as burglary and other violations of the District of Columbia Code. Gonzalez plead guilty on January 15, 1973, and on November 9, 1973, was sentenced to from one to six years in the custody of the Attorney General. 7. HARRY ROBBINS (BOB) HALDEMAN Former Chief of Staff at the White House and generally reported to be the most influential of the President’s advisors, Haldeman was an advanceman in the President’s 1960 presidential campaign and Chief of Staff in the President’s 1968 campaign. He came to the White House as Chief of Staff immediately after the 1968 inaugural and remained in that position until April 30, 1973, when he resigned simultaneous with John Ehrlichman and Attorney General Kleindienst. Haldeman is 47 years of age and was employed as a Vice President with the J. Walter Thompson Advertising Agency in Los Angeles prior to assuming his duties with President Nixon. Prosecutive Action Haldeman was indicted on March 1, 1974, on one count of Conspiracy to Obstruct Justice, one count of Obstruction of Justice, and three counts of Perjury. Haldeman entered not guilty pleas to all counts of the indictment on March 9, 1974. 8. GEORGE A. HEARING A Tampa, Florida, accountant who was indicted by a Federal Grand Jury in Tampa along with Donald Segretti on charges of printing and conspiring to distribute a bogus letter during the 1972 presidential campaign. Prosecutive Action Indicted by a Federal Grand Jury, Tampa, Florida, May 4, 1973, on counts of fabricating and distributing illegal campaign literature. Plead guilty on May 11, 1973, and sentenced on June 15, 1973, to one year in the custody of the Attorney General. The count on conspiracy was dis- missed at this time. Y =) 9. E. HOWARD HUNT, JR. Born October 9, 1918, in Hamburg, New York. A former employee of the CIA having retired from the Agency in 1970 after more 1-U n «. ^ A ** nr. m A -f n -M«r 1 LI 1 cl 11 6 U yectl'D Ul oci vitc^ T T ^ i vt ^ n v\l y\ J **% w* n t-1- J «vi /\ ^1 An on 1 1 n n ^ iiuiit wcto cmpuj^tru uu ct pai mine: cunoLUiam basis with the White House through the auspices of Charles Colson, Special Counsel to the President. Hunt's involvement with the five subjects found inside the Watergate complex was established shortly after the subjects were arrested. It was established that Hunt had assembled the Cuban-American members of the burglary team who had prior CIA contacts with Hunt. Hunt was uncooperative with the Bureau agents when interviewed and gave no information which assisted in the solution of tv. i o ao o n UllkJ VdrOCr iJiinf f c oa! iirif iao of fV\ D Wliifo Wrttioci i mrol tr orl cOTrorol nfVi or UUUl kJ (VVC1V 1 tic iJ uc U1V T T U1VV 11UUOV HIT V1T VU kjv » VI M>i VH1V1 very sensitive matters including the ITT affair with specific assignments relating to Dita Beard, the Ellsberg case, and the collection of intelli- gence information regarding Senator Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts. Very sensitive information regarding these activities held in Hunt's safe in the Executive Office Building were the cause of John Dean requesting former Acting Director Gray to assume custody of this material and allegedly stating it should never see the light of day. Hunt is alleged to havp HomonrlpH ciiVic+anHal fnnHe frnm thp pAmmiffflo +n Rp-RIpnl VAViliUilUVVI A. A- V -ft A A Hi V VV4. President and the White House in order to maintain silence in regard to his activities. Hunt’s wife died on December 8, 1972, in an aircraft crash in Chicago. Bureau agents recovered $10, 000 in one hundred dollar bills in Mrs. Hunt’s purse at the time of the crash. Prosecutive Action On September 15, 1972, Hunt was indicted by a Federal Grand Jury in Washington, D. C. , on charges of Interception of Communications, Conspiracy and Burglary. On January 11, 1973, Hunt plead guilty to all counts and on November 9, 1973, received a sentence of from 30 months to eight years in the custody of the Attorney General and a $10,000 fine. Hunt is presently free on bond appealing his sentence in this case. 10. HERBERT W. KALMBACH Formerly the personal attorney for President Nixon and a partner in the Los Angeles law firm of Kalmbach, De Marco, Knapp and Chillings- worth, Kalmbach is also a long time associate of Robert H. Finch, former Lt. Governor of California and former Secretary of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. - 94 - Kalmbach was born October 19, 1921, in Ft. Huron, Michigan, and graduated from the University of Southern California Law School. Kalmbach was the Associate Finance Chairman of the 1968 Nixon presidential campaign and worked directly for Maurice Stans. Kalmbach also worked as a fund raiser for the President's re-election prior to the official establishment of the Committee to Re-Elect the President. Kalmbach 's primary involvement in the Watergate affair appears to have been obstruction of justice through the providing of money to be used to silence the seven original defendants. He also provided money to Donald Segretti which was used in illegal campaign activities. Prosecutive Action An information was filed in Federal Court, District of Columbia, on February 25, 1974, charging violations of the Federal corrupt practices act and a misdemeanor count of promising an Ambassadorship in return for a campaign contribution. Kalmbach entered a guilty plea to these counts on February 25, 1974. 11. EGIL E. KROGH, JR. Krogh joined the White House in May 1969 as an Aide to then Presidential Counsel John D. Ehrlichman. Krogh had previously worked for Ehrlichman in a law firm in Seattle, Washington. Krogh also worked on the Domestic Council of the White House and was involved in such projects as transportation, narcotics control, corrections and legal services. Krogh was placed in direct charge of the White House Investi- gations Unit responsible for the investigation of the leak in the Pentagon Papers matter and later publicly accepted full responsibility for the burglary of Daniel Ellsberg’s psychiatrist's office by members of the White House "Plumbers” group. At the time that Krogh acknowledged his responsibility for the burglary he was employed as Under Secretary of Transportation, a post from which he resigned on May 9, 1973. Prosecutive Action On November 30, 1973, Krogh entered a guilty plea to one count of violating the civil rights of Dr. Lewis Fielding, Daniel Ellsberg’s psychiatrist, in the September 3-4, 1971, break-in at Fielding’s office. Krogh was sentenced on January 24, 1974, to serve six months of a two to six year term in the custody of the Attorney General. - 95 - 12. FREDERICK C. LA RUE A Jackson, Mississippi, businessman who came to Washington in 1969 as a Special Assistant to the President. After the formation of the Committee to Re-Elect the President LaRue transferred to this Committee and was an assistant to John Mitchell. In his statement before the Senate Watergate Committee on July 18, 1973, LaRue admitted that he participated in the Watergate cover up including helping to deliver cash intended for the seven defendants in the Watergate burglary trial. LaRue was present at the March 30, 1972, meeting in Key Biscayne, Florida, where John Mitchell, Jeb Stuart Magruder, G. Gordon Liddy and LaRue discussed intelligence plans for the Committee to Re-Elect the President, during which time Jeb Magruder has stated Mitchell approved Liddy T s plan for electronic surveillance coverage of the Democratic National Committee as well as other illicit campaign tactics. LaRue has also admitted that he transferred $210, 000 of the Committee to Re-Elect the President's money to William O. Bittman, a lawyer for E. Howard Hunt, Jr. , one of the seven original defendants. It was La Rue's understanding that Bittman would disburse the money to various defendants in the Watergate case and their lawyers. Bittman stated that the money was distributed according to directions he received from John Dean. Prosecutive Action ■ o rt ■4 fit 70 T ^ —1 J wii juhu < 51 , 1^1 a, ijcmut? pxe■ A A A* H ^ W 4. V V ^ approved the electronic surveillance project on March 30, 1972, while in Key Biscayne, Florida. Prosecutive Action On March 1, 1974, Mitchell was indicted by a Federal Grand Jury on seven counts including conspiracy to obstruct justice, two counts of mnkino 4 cifnfpmAnf c; tn o HronH .Tnru V WM.V VU1V11V V* VW LV A VVIVi VJ A. L/ VAA J J r\n& nmmf nf noriuru J y V/4i V W one count of making false statements to FBI agents and one count of obstruction of justice. Mitchell plead innocent on March 9, 1974, and a tentative trial date has been set for September 9, 1974. On April 28, 1974, Mitchell along with former Secretary of Commerce Maurice H. Stans were acquitted on charges of obstruction of justice in connection with the Robert Vesco case wherein it was charged that they (Mitchell and Stans) attempted to influence the Securities and Exchange Commission fn ffjlrp fovnvQMp f r\r* V r* cnn in 1 1 1 i crn t i nn that fh & an H A tv T V* WrPV IV 1.4. Wi-VTAA AVI ? V U V V/ .1AL A A L AV A A. VIA W V VA A V W VU4. AV A V W U.A IVi Exchange Commission had undertaken. - 100 - 19. KENNETH W. PARKINSON A prominent Washington attorney who has been active in civic and legal affairs in the District of Columbia for several years. He is a past President of the Junior Chamber of Commerce and has served as an officer of the District of Columbia Bar Association and President of the Legal Aid Society. Parkinson was retained by the Committee for the Re-Election of the President immediately following the Watergate break-in arrests. Parkinson represented the Re-Election Committee in several suits brought by Democratic Party officials. Parkinson also sat in on FBI interviews with Re-Election Committee employees and it was alleged that at least on one occasion Parkinson confronted an employee and accused her of talkhg to the FBI without his authority. Prosecutive Action On March 1, 1974, Parkinson was indicted by a Federal Grand Jury on one count of conspiracy to obstruct justice and one count of obstruction of justice. Parkinson plead not guilty on March 9, 1974. A trial date of September 9, 1974, was set. 20. HERBERT L. PORTER Former Scheduling Director, Committee for the Re-Election of the President, Porter testified before the Senate Watergate Committee on June 7, 1973. Porter advised the Committee that Jeb Magruder, former Deputy Director of the Nixon campaign asked him (Porter) to tell a fabricated story about what happened to $100,000 in cash given to convicted Watergate conspirator G. Gordon Liddy. Porter also admitted that he had related the false account of how the funds were used to the FBI and to the Watergate Federal Grand Jury. Prosecutive Action On January 28, 1974, Porter plead guilty to a one count information charging false statements to FBI agents. He was sentenced on April 11, 1974, to serve 30 days of a five to fifteen month sentence. Porter was released from custody on May 20, 1974. - 101 - 1 21 jjuNALu H. SEGkEttI A California attorney born in San Marino, California, in 1941 and educated at the University of Southern California. At the University of Southern California Segretti became acquainted with Dwight Chapin, former Appointments Secretary to President Nixon. Segretti served in a legal position with the Treasury Department in Washington, D. C. , and later joined the U. S. Army where he served as an attorney in the Judge Advocate’s General Corps. Herbert Kalmbach, former personal attorney to President Nixon has advised Bureau agents that Segretti was brought to his attention by Dwight Chapin and that he met with Segretti on Chapin’s instructions in August or September 1971 as Segretti was leaving the Army. Chapin instructed Kalmbach to pay Segretti $16, 000 per year and expenses out of campaign contributions collected before the April 7, 1972, law requiring campaign contribution disclosure became effective. Segretti in testimony before the Senate Watergate Committee on October 3, 1973, confirmed that he had been hired in the Summer of 1971 by two former University of Southern California classmates, Dwight Chapin and Gordon Strachan, who were both then employed by the White House. Segretti advised he was instructed to perform certain political functions for the re-election of the President. Segretti stated he considered these functions to be "similar to college pranks which had occurred at the University of Southern California and that there was nothing improper or illegal in such traditional activities. " He was later instructed by Chapin that his duties would consist of various activities tending to foster a split between the various Democratic hopefuls and to prevent the Democratic Party from uniting on one candidate. Segretti stated he had received $45,000 in expense money from Herbert W. Kalmbach during the period September 1971 to March 1972 and bi-weekly salary payments of $667 during the same period. Prosecutive Action On September 27, 1973, Segretti was indicted by a Federal Grand Jury in Washington, D. C. , on charges of the illegal distribution of false campaign literature. Segretti plead guilty on October 1, 1973, was sen- tenced to one year on each count, suspended with six months in the custody of the Attorney General and probation for three years. Segretti was released from Federal custody on March 25, 1974. - 102 - 22 . GORDON C. STRACHAN Graduate of the University of Southern California who received his law degree from the University of California. Strachan worked for President Nixon’s former law firm in New York for two years before joining the White House Staff in August 1970 as an Assistant to White House Chief of Staff H. R. (Bob) Haldeman. Strachan worked for Haldeman until December 1972 when he became General Counsel for the United States Information Agency. He assumed that position in January of 1973 and resigned on April 30, 1973, the same day that Haldeman resigned his position as White House Chief of Staff. Strachan served as the liaison representative between Haldeman and the Committee to Re-Elect the President during 1972 campaign. Jeb Stuart Magruder, former Deputy Director of the Nixon campaign testified that Strachan was kept informed of plans to develop a covert intelligence gathering operation involving break-ins and illegal wiretapping being carried out by the Re-Election Committee. Magruder also stated that Strachan had been informed that the operation had been approved and that Strachan was furnished with copies of "Gemstone” materials for transmittal to his White House superiors. Strachan has testified that Haldeman had told him on June 20, 1972, three days after the Watergate break-in to "make sure our files are clean". Strachan testified that he destroyed documents that had been received in the White House from the Re-Election Committee as a result of that order from Haldeman. Strachan has also stated that he returned to Frederick C. LaRue, an official of the Re-Election Committee, $350,000 in cash being kept in the White House. LaRue has testified that this money was given to the Watergate defendants as part of the "cover up. " Prosecutive Action On March 1, 1974, Strachan was indicted by a Federal Grand Jury, Washington, D. C. , on counts of conspiracy to obstruct justice, obstruction of justice and making false statements to a Federal Grand Jury. Strachan plead innocent on March 9, 1974, and a tentative trial date has been set for September 9, 1974. - 103 - 23. FRANK ANTHONY STURGIS Sturgis, who was born Frank Anthony Fiorini, later changed his name to Sturgis, was one of the five defendants arrested during the Watergate burglary on June 17, 1972. Sturgis is a Miami resident and the operator of the Hampton Roads Salvage Company in Miami. He is a long time associate of fellow Watergate defendants Bernard L. Barker and Eugenio Martinez. Sturgis lost his U. S. citizenship in 1960 when he enlisted in the armed forces of a foreign nation (the Cuban Army). He has been involved with the International Anti -Communist Brigade and other anti-d^ M Sturgis has declined to cooperate with Burea\^Igenl investigating the Watergate matters. Prosecutive Action Sturgis was indicted by a Federal Grand Jury on September 15, 1972, on counts of Interception of Communications, Conspiracy and Burglary. He plead guilty on January 15, 1973, and was sentenced on November 9, 1973, to serve to from one to four years. Sturgis was freed pending an appeal on January 18, 1974. - 104 - APPENDIX C EXPLANATORY NOTES AND DOCUMENTATION 1. Airtel from Acting Director FBI, to SACs Washington Field, Atlanta, Alexandria, Baltimore, Boston, Kansas City, New York, and Philadelphia; captioned "James Walter McCord, Jr. ; Bernard L. Barker, et al. , Burglary of Democratic Party National Headquarters, 6/17/72, Interception of Communications - Conspiracy," Bureau file No. 139-4089. 2. "Plumbers" is a name given the White House Special Investigations Unit. The Unit was under the direction of Egil Krogh. 3. General Investigative Division Inspection; Inspector W. M. Mooney, Report dated 8/10/73, Pages 69-77. 4. W. M. Felt to Walters memorandum, dated 5/22/73, captioned "Watergate. " 5. L. M. Walters to Felt memorandum, dated 5/23/73, captioned "Watergate. " 6. Memorandum to Mr. Archibald Cox, Special Prosecuting Attorney, from Acting Director FBI, dated 6/7/73, captioned "Watergate - Events at Initial Stage of Case. " 7. Inspector James Joseph O’Connor to Mr. Jacobson memorandum, dated 6/26/73, captioned "Watergate - Analysis of Possible Involvement by L. Patrick Gray. " 8. Letter to Special Prosecutor’s Office, from Director, FBI, dated 4/10/74, captioned "Confirmation Hearings of L. Patrick Gray III. " 9. For comments and/or criticisms in this general area see Transcript of White House Tapes , pages 258-259, 821-822; Transcript of Silbert Confirmation Hearings , pages 38-39, 97-99; Report of Senate Watergate Hearings , pages 940-941, 944-945, 3478-3482; A Piece of Tape: The Watergat e Storys Fact or Fiction by James W. McCord, pages 66, 236-237, 312-313, 324; All The President’s Men by Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward, pages 172, 232; Watergate: The Full Inside Story by Lewis Chester, Et Al, pages 182, 186; L. Patrick Gray in, Senate Confirmation Hearings, pages 45-46, 57, 304, 331-332, 334-339, 345, 347, 358, 361, 375, 619, 653, 692-693. - 105 - 10. See Silbert Hearings, Op. cit. , pages 81-82, 84, 154-161; Senate Watergate Hearings, Op. cit., pages 3485, 3848-3849; McCord, Op. cit., pages 39, 43, 65-66; Bernstein and Woodward, Op. cit., pages 41, 67, 172; Gray Hearings, Op. cit. , pages 334-336, 345. 11. See White House Transcript, Op. cit. , pages 270-271; Silbert Hearings, Op. cit. , pages 37-43; Senate Watergate Hearings, Op. cit. , page 3467; Bernstein and Woodward, Op. cit. , page 232; Chester, Op. cit. , page 183; Gray Confirmation Hearings, Op. cit., pages 328, 350-354, 676, 692; "The Judge Who Tried Harder" by George V. Higgins in "The Atlantic Magazine", April 1974, page 103. 12. See White House Transcripts, Op. cit. , pages 185-186; Silbert Confirmation Hearings, Op. cit. , page 32; Senate Watergate Hearings, Op. cit., pages 963, 3485-3486, 3554-3555, 3582, 3790; McCord, Op. cit. , page 39. 13. See Silbert Confirmation Hearings, Op. cit. , pages 57-58, 104, 179-183; Chester, Op. cit. , page 186; Bernstein and Woodward, Op. cit. , pages 29-31, 35. 14. See Silbert Confirmation Hearings, Op. cit., pages 15-16, 32; Senate Watergate Hearings, Op. cit., pages 3521, 3848-3849; McCord, Op. cit., pages 37-38, 40; Bernstein and Woodward, Op. cit., page 173. 15. See Silbert Confirmation Hearings, Op. cit. , page 64; Bernstein and Woodward, Op. cit. , page 200. 16. See White House Transcripts, Op. cit. , page 56-57; Silbert Con- firmation Hearings, Op. cit. , pages 99-101; Senate Watergate Hearings, Op. cit., pages 3548, 3595-3596, 3651-3652; McCord, Op. cit., pages 25-26 (McCord states that he installed two electronic devices on the telephones in the Democratic National Committee Headquarters, Watergate Office Building, that were not detected or removed by the FBI; the first was removed in December 1972 from the telephone of Spencer Oliver and the second was not removed until April 1973. ) 17. See White House Transcripts, Op. cit. , page 381; Silbert Con- firmation Hearings, Op. cit., 109-110, 116-119, 122-124, 126-127, 132, 135-136; Senate Watergate Hearings, Op. cit., pages 3551-3552, 3620- 3621; Bernstein and Woodward, op. cit., pages 18, 29-31, 35, 107, 166; Chester, Op. cit. , pages 183-184, 188; Gray Confirmation Hearings, Op. cit., pages 44, 57-60, 77, 144, 147-148, 177, 214-219, 224, 305-307, 347, 391, 599, 625, 664-665, 691. - 106 - 18. See White House Transcripts, Op. cit. , pages 131-132, 185-186, 821-822, 865, 1218; Silbert Confirmation Hearings, Op. cit., pages 43-44, 124-125; Senate Watergate Hearings, Op. cit. , pages 3450-3467 (re CIA connection), 3467-3472 (re John Dean and Hunt files), 3624-3625; McCord, Op. cit. , pages XI, 40, 228-229, 237, 319; Bernstein and Woodward, Op. cit., pages 107, 146, 166, 230; Chester, Op. cit., 189, 204; Higgins, Op. cit. , 102-103; also see pages listed in Footnote 17, supra, re Gray Confirmation Hearings regarding Donald Segretti matter. 19. See White House Transcripts, Op. cit. , page 88; Senate Confirmation Hearings, Op. cit., pages 124-126; Bernstein and Woodward, Op. cit., pages 66, 146, 165, 270. 20. See White House Transcripts, Op. cit., pages 185-186; Silbert Con- firmation Hearings, Op. cit. , pages 135-136; Senate Watergate Hearings, Op. cit. , pages 940-941, 3532; Bernstein and Woodward, Op. cit. , pages 4 CO 1 OO A C TJ * io i ; vjray Cuiuir iiiation * TT *_ near mgs, up. ciu , pages J <\nA 21. See White House Transcripts, Op. cit. , pages 185-186; Silbert Con- firmation Hearings, Op. cit., pages 11-12, 23, 25, 29, 35-37, 51-53, 65, 73-74, 110-115, 127, 132, 171, 173, 175, 186, 188; Senate Watergate Hearings, Op. cit. , pages 3560-3567, 3620-3625; McCord, Op. cit. , pages XI, XV, 35, 39, 234-235, 237-238, 315-316, 319, 325-327; Bernstein and Woodward, Op. cit. , pages 127; Chester, pages 166-167. 22. See Silbert Confirmation Hearings, Op. cit. , pages 63-72; Senate Watergate Hearings, Op. cit. , pages 3403-3449, 3815, 3450-3467, 3648, 3821-3822; McCord, Op. cit., pages 49-51; Bernstein and Woodward, Op. cit., pages 73, 318; Chester, Op. cit., 186-192, 214, 225, 226-227. 23. See White House Transcripts, Op. cit. , pages 128-129 (This is a conversation between the President and White House Counsel John Dean in titK i fli o nn /'ll o miD nirtcr o oimnnoA/J r\r\ 1 1 fn /»n1 non rv’f fKo TPT5.T Ktt fKn w uiv^n tuv jr ai c uiatUdOUig lilc. uuv,tu uov ui uiv x i wjr uic Johnson Administration. During this conversation the President states "How bad would it hurt the country, John, to have the FBI so terribly damaged?" Dean replies, "Do you mind if I take this back and kick it around with Dick Moore? These other questions. I think it would be damaging to the FBI, but may be it is time to shake the FBI and re- build it. I am not so sure that the FBI is everything it is cracked up to be. I am convinced that the FBI isn't everything the public thinks it is. ") Potroc t fin +Viic /»rmi7fircQfiAn Kotiuorm fho cmrl TriHn Doon A U AW AW yj.ll U 1 ; U VVU V VA U L< K IVU 1/L^ I, VY ^ LU«w JL. A Vj W 11L U^l VVA U VJ11U. J L/VUAL they are discussing the adequacy of the investigation and the performance of Assistant Attorney General Henry Petersen. The President states to - 107 - sL * Dean "Do you honestly feel that he did an adequate job?” Dean replied, "They ran that investigation out to the fullest extend they could follow a lead and that was it." The President then asked "But the way point is, where I suppose he could be criticized for not doing an adequate job. Why didn’t he call Haldeman? Why didn't he get a statement from Colson? Oh, they did get Colson!" Dean then stated, "That’s right. But as based on their FBI interviews, there was no reason to follow up. There were no leads there. Colson said, 'I have no knowledge of this’ to the FBI. Strachan said, 'I have no knowledge. ’ They didn’t ask Strachan any questions about Watergate. They asked him about Segretti. They said, ’what is your connection with Liddy?’ Strachan just said, ’Well, I met him over there. ’ They never really pressed him. Strachan appeared, as a result of some coaching, to be the dumbest paper pusher in the bowels of the White House. ’’ Pages 270-271 (In this conversation between the President, Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Ehrlichman, Mr. Dean and Mr. Mitchell on March 22, 1973, they discussed the testimony of L. Patrick Gray IH during his Senate confirmation hearing indicating that John Dean probably lied to FBI agents about whether or not Howard Hunt had an office in the White House. Dean states to the President that he had indicated that he would check it out and that the agent had asked if he could see the office and that Dean had told him that he would have to check it out. Dean is complaining that the headlines will state "Gray says Dean lies. " And the President indicates that Mr. Gray probably misunderstood the question and Mitchell states "Another factor — those agents may not have reported it exactly.") Pages 338, 566-567 (In this conversation between the President, Haldeman and Ehrlichman on April 14, 1973, the adequacy of Ehrlichman’s inquiry into the Watergate cover up is being discussed. Haldeman states "Did you review the FBI files?" Ehrlichman "No." Haldeman, "Why not? That’s the original source you said was the most extensive investigation in history. Why the hell didn’t you look at it?" Ehrlichman, "I didn't look at because I didn't need to look at it. I got a summary. " Later in this conversation Ehrlichman indicates that the summary he reviewed was a Justice Department summary and that he did not attempt to duplicate the inquiry that had been conducted by the U. S. Attorney, the Federal Grand Jury or the Justice Department. ) Pages 1216-1220. (These pages reflect the transcript of a conversation between the President and two attorneys 'f t' T-T O. 1 #4 /S. A A IT' W m 1 ■! a 1a w\ n -wto fA. ^ w* 1 /i Am A VI •**J A X iT vk 04- i A 1 r 1 A T\i i wi 4 m A* xv/i liaiucmau anu dui iiuiuiiau, iviF. w uauu clilu Mr. . uui mg this conversation Mr. Wilson relates to the President, Ehrlichman's version of what happened when John Dean turned over certain materials from Howard Hunt's White House safe to Mr. Gray in the presence of John Ehrlichman); Silbert Confirmation Hearings, Op. cit. , pages 106, 113, 125-126, 171 ; Bernstein and Woodward, Op. cit., pages 205, 216-217, 238, 272, 274, 277, 293-294, 306; Chester, Op. cit., pages 183-185, 187- 189, 191; Higgins, Op. cit. , pages 102, 105; there are also numerous irtcf Onr»^CI Aifiirl dnt*inrr fkn t/iof a# T. i untune, v u civcu uui xug uic LVCJt inn^uj wi i-J* Dofviirtlr rir» o T7 • nor»o! UM 1fny*0 X CL ti l^n. V> X CL jr y VJLli^-1 ax Tl axwx O y - 108 - Deputy Director of the CIA, John Dean, Henry Petersen, John Ehrlichman and H. R. Haldeman before the Senate Watergate Committee in relationship to attempted White House interference during the initial stages of the FBI’s Watergate investigation. 24. W. W. Bradley to Mr. Conrad memorandum, dated April 12, 1973, captioned ’’James W. McCord, et al, IOC - Democratic National Committee Headquarters (DNCH),” file No. 139-4089, serial 2001. 25. Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary, U. S. Senate on Nomination of William D. Ruckelshaus To Be Deputy Attorney General, page 49. 26. Ibid. , page 61 - 109 - FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION WATERGATE (SUMMARY) PART 2 of 2 FILE NUMBER : 139-4089 )r . v ' O j £? 3 WATERGATE SPECIAL PROSECUTION FORCE United States Department of Justice 1425 K Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20005 October 16, 1975 ROUTE TO D.O. FOE SIGNATURg 30 c. Dir. . 7^“ Honorable Clarence M. Kelley Director Federal Bureau of Investigation Washington, D. C. 20537 Dear Clarence: I am enclosing a copy of a Report covering the activities of the Watergate Special Prosecution Force from May 1973 to September 15, 1975. Dep.-A D Dep -A I Asst. Dir.: Admin. ... Comp, £ yst Ext A'fairifTZ Sues & Cj Gen, Inv; Ident L J Inspection _ Intel L Lalx- r? torv . Plan E yaL _ Spec. Inv, _ Training Legal Conn. Telephone Rm. * DtrefrtdF J 9 * ; Vt/afl'# fi! c{ As you know, we have relied heavily on the Bureau for investigative assistance in many extremely important areas of our work. I want to express my personal appreciation to you and to each of the agents and the supervisory personnel who cooperated so well in the mission of this Office. io ~£3 * ^ Best wishes. Sincere ly , 'iU-.fuZ HENRY S. RUTH, JR. J-* Special Prosecutor ijr /2>?~ Y0 q t* 4 era 1~ i rm g fn w w W J tl 4 * A. V" «. #- V* V- •*« W V* AW ■* W A W W- Vr* V-4> W h# V W A A W Ar A A ▼ W W W ^ ^ V4 W Af v 4- L W W V be undertaken, the persons to be charged and the charges to be brought, including decisions concerning plea negotiations. However, the Report does not set out facts about individual cases or criminal charges other than those that have been presented in court or otherwise made public, because, as ex-. plained in the Introduction to the Report, to do so would be inconsistent with fundamental protections which our system of justice accords to individuals. The Report describes in detail the Special Prosecutor's ■ efforts to obtain tapes, documents and other information and ftia f- at* “ f «j 1 nf f'ho Wi vnn AHrri i r> i c fr a f i r»r> Ini ni Pfj jaf glv V* & iV 4,1 W4* U VA* after Cox's appointment and continuing for several months after President Nixon' s . resignation. It also describes the deliberations and the actions of the Special Prosecutor relating to the possibility of criminal charges against President Nixon and the cooperation between WSPF and the House Judiciary Committee during that Committee's investiga- tions and deliberations about possible impeachment. Finally, the Report states some concluding observations UA 4 U U.LU es o C or^ a o kj NA 0 W A. O. U . ^ i^rnrc. Ch.r'v rvir« o Via oo<^ I WUUU^.ilUH L. .L Ih^UU VU 1 iTlAn W*]-' W|ii t“Vi A ovno V ■y 1 JL. of the prosecutors during their 28-months' work. Since the Prosecution Force was not a commission or study group, the proposed recommendations are not intended as a comprehensive finding as to the changes needed to prevent and challenge abuses of power. A detailed series of appendices follows the main body of the Report. There are summarized below those chapters of the Report setting forth WSPF’s recommendations, the policies and proce- /1 1 1 V A C f \ f TaJ Q PT? 1 A 1 It 1 T“S rt rt r\ n « -f /\ i n « i ♦- « « a J aw a 4— a m, >*v*4- ww WA. MW* i A.UWXUUJ.U^ auuuu UDCVUL J.UL19 LU UC undertaken and about plea bargaining, descriptions of major - investigations, efforts to obtain evidence from the White House, and actions related to possible criminal prosecution against President Nixon. 3 \r '{ } v ‘ WSPF Recommendations (Chapter 5) 1. Protecting the Integrity and Effectiveness of the Prosecution Function Among recommendations seeking to insulate the Department of Justice from political pressure were the following: - Neither the campaign manager nor any other top officials of the President's campaign should become Attorney General. - The Hatch Act should apply to all Justice Dep ar tment employ e e s . - A written record should be maintained of all outside contacts with Justice Department officials concerning pending matters. - A new unit with adequate resources should be established within the Justice Department to investigate and prosecute corruption cases. - An Office of Permanent Special Prosecutor should not be established. - The organized bar and the courts should clarify and more actively inquire into possible conflicting interests in one attorney's repre- sentation of both higher-level and lower-level employees during a federal investigation of the leadership's conduct in hierarchial organi- zations, such as corporations, labor unions and government agencies. - In order to ensure a continuous flow of informa- tion from cooperating witnesses, the Freedom of Information Act should be clarified to protect absolutely information obtained confidentially by law enforcement agencies. 2. Protecting the Integrity of Executive Branch Functions in Law Enforcement - Congress should exercise effective oversight of enforcement and intelligence agencies through -.-r * • r 4 regular review of agency policies , internal inspec- tion procedures and other checks on how sensitive functions are being performed. - A constitutional amendment should clarify if and when a President in office is subject to criminal prosecution. 3 . C ontrol of Intelligence and National Security . Functions - All intelligence agencies should issue written policies setting forth types of domestic intelli- gence to be gathered and methods to be used. These policies should be reviewed by a domestic intelligence policy review board. - The Administration should clarify its present policy on warrantless searches and seizures in connection with foreign intelligence investi- gations. 4. Political Financing and Campaign Tactics - The Department of Justice should take the initia- tive in undertaking investigations and prosecutions for campaign financing violations without waiting for referral of complaints from other agencies or individuals . - Individual responsibility for the various reporting requirements of a campaign committee under the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) should be extended to include committee chairmen, rather than just the treasurers of such committees. - The statute of limitations on election law viola- tions , amended retroactively in the middle of WSPF’s work to a three-year period, should be restored to the five-year period applicable to almost all other federal crimes. - Several amendments are needed to the FECA pro- visions barring corporate contributions and contributions by a government contractor in order to clarify the extent and nature of the criminal prohibitions and make them more consistent in approach to the problems of campaign financing. (See pp 149-152 of Report) • v . * i r r*.' ' ,v v-rc -? ^r. ■ ( .t ~ r* rr. ;.t:> - ■ #■ - + 4 5 \ - The authority of the Federal Election Commission should be broadened with respect to "dirty tricks" to enable it to promulgate standards ' of unaccepted campaign conduct. WSPF Policie s and Procedures for Investigation and Prosecution XChapter^i) A. Beginning Investigations The Report describes the various sources of information on the basis of which decisions were made to undertake investi- gations. It notes that with respect to some areas of its responsibility, WSPF began with the benefit of prior investiga- tive work by other agencies while with respect to others, little prior work had been done. It describes the Special Prosecutor's decision to utilize the FBI as its principal investigating agency, a decision that Cox reached only after satisfying him- self that alleged improprieties by some former high FBI officials did not involve those who vrould be responsible for work undertaken for the Special Prosecutor. B. The Investigative Process The Report details the various investigative techniques used by WFPF, noting similarities and differences in comparison with other "white-collar" crime investigations. Among the differences were the special problems resulting from the White House's refusal to make available important evi- dence, the intense interest of the news media, and WSPF's need to maintain public support in view of the threat its work pre- sented to the President and others in high positions. The Report describes the various methods used for obtain- ing information from witnesses, including FBI interviews, of- fice interviews and bringing the witness before the grand jury and the role each of these methods played in WSPF's investiga- tions. It notes that only about 30 of the several hundred wit- M A. M A A * A W « A A ^ ■ W. ^ A ■» -m A V J ■* ^ A A A M 4 — A. #4 ^ l‘l ■ ■ * L« < A ^ M A A 111 ^ 4“ LLtiS W11U WCLC XUUCi V1CWCU WCI C giailUCU JUU1U1U11JLU/ ao a lucauo WA. obtaining crucial information. An important reason for this was WSPF's belief that most of those who were at relatively "low" levels of the conspiracies and other wrong-doing it was investigating held important positions of public trust and were not entitled to complete immunity. Whenever possible in such situations, WSPF sought to obtain the information it needed on the basis of a plea bargain in order that a court could im- pose an appropriate penalty. C. Chareinc and Disnosine of Casas l_i - a - - - -.--a - — : The Report analyzes the bases on which WSPF decided whether to charge persons and what particular charges to bring. The case involving the burglary of the office of Dr. Fielding, Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist, is used as an example to describe the factual and legal considerations that led to re- jection of certain charges and the decision to bring others - in that case conspiracy to violate Dr. Fielding's Fourth Amend- ment rights to not be victimized by an illegal search and seizure. The Report describes the issues the Special Prosecutor faced in deciding whether to bring perjury charges and whether to invoke the federal conspiracy statute in those cases where 9 it appeared to be applicable. ^ * The Report also explains why instead of using the minimum required standard of proof for a grand jury indictment, the Special Prosecutor sought to use a higher standard and thus ah crK 1 i i a i-rr, on f* e ICC nr 1 \r V/lr* J tiiVi o n all t - V> o u. ^ X axrm' 1 aV .1 a u V UX XUU xv OIT ’I A OT> i v y xuv:* 1 i rs . x*v eluding the defendant's explanations, seemed likely to result in a guilty verdict at trial. The Report indicates the special circumstances that in some cases led the prosecutors to believe leniency was jus- tified in making charging decisions. Thus, in a few cases the defendant's health was taken into account. In others, the defendants seemed to have relied on advice of counsel as to the legality of their actions or on prior non-enforcement de- cisions by government agencies. w w Plea Bargaining Without plea bargaining the Special Prosecutor would have been able to convict only a small number of the persons who were shown on investigation to have committed crimes. In- formation obtained by plea bargaining was crucially important in many of the major prosecutions and convictions. 8 The Report describes Special Prosecutor Cox’s offer of leniency to corporations which volunteered information about their violations of the campaign financing laws. The reasons for Cox's policy, which was adhered to by each succeeding Special Prosecutor, are described in full in the Report and include proof difficulties, prior lack of enforcement and corporate disclosure of prior practices. The volunteer policy resulted in guilty pleas by 12 corporations and 10 corporate officers. These pleas, and others that followed in the campaign contributions area, marked the first time in many years that corporate officers had been convicted for consenting to illegal contributions . The Report describes WSPF's concern that guilty pleas involve admission of guilt to a sufficiently serious charge to enable the judge to impose an appropriate sentence. In general the Special Prosecutor was willing to accept a plea to one felony charge. Most federal felonies permit a five-year maximum sentence. WSPF also believed that guilty pleas should V A O A 1 A f'Ts A 4 A A44 M A ■C 4— k a. J ^ f J JL- 1 Jit. - J - ^ t,iic xo o uc u a. cue ucit:nuciuu s guilt or innocence ot the underlying conduct which the evidence established. Thus, WSPF refused to accept pleas if the defendant was asserting his innocence in court at the time of the plea, and, with one exception involving one of the first campaign-law violators to come forward voluntarily, refused to accept pleas of nolo contendere. In a few other situations the Special Prosecutor was willing to accept guilty pleas that did not fully meet these concerns, and the Report sets out the range of considera- tions that led to the acceptance of such pleas. The Report also notes that in considering a plea agree- ment, WSPF was concerned that where subordinates had been convicted and sentenced, the principle of proportionality prevented accepting a plea to a lesser charge from a person who had directed his criminal activities. Major Investigations and Other Actions (Chapter 3) The most important work of VJSPF's five task forces and the counsel’s office is summarized in Chapter 3 of the Report. Not included are large numbers of investigations which involved a relatively minor commitment of office resources and a lesser number of investigations, requiring more substantial efforts, which have not been publicly disclosed in the past and which did not result in charges. Reporting them would publicize, for the first time and in an improper forum, allega- tions from which the prosecutors concluded they should not initiate court action for the various reasons cited in Chapter 2. In the investigations included within this chapter, allegations are cited if they have already received extensive publicity or if they had become public through court proceedings * , legislative inquiries or other forums. A section of the work of the Watergate Task Force briefly describes its three investigations. The Watergate cover-up investigation resulted in the prosecution and felony conviction of eight men formerly associated with the White House or the President's Campaign Committee. On January 15, 1974, a panel of tapes' experts appointed by Judge Sirica concluded that an 18 1/2 minute gap in a subpoenaed Presidential tape recording of June 20, 1972 had been produced by at least five separate hand operations of the stop and record buttons of a Uher 5000 machine, the same model used by the President's secretary, Rose Mary Woods, in transcribing the tape. Since the experts' report made it clear that the gap had been caused i by intentional erasures, and evidence produced at earlier hearings showed that the erasures had occurred after the tape had been subpoenaed, Judge Sirica had referred the matter to the grand jury for further investigation of the possibility A ^ ^ til ^ -V*, « A ^ ^ A M A ^ Vi UUbUUCLiUU UJL justice . A /I grand jury, assisted by r mnw warr and the FBI, concluded from the testimony of over 50 people that a very small number of persons could have been responsible for the erasures, but it was unable to obtain evidence sifficient to prosecute any individual. Another matter which arose as part of the Watergate cover- up investigation was an inquiry into President Nixon's sub- mission of Presidential tape transcripts to the House Judiciary 11 i \ Committee on April 30. 1974. Comparison of the President's ♦ — submission with transcripts in WSPF's possession showed that the President's version contained several omissions of por- tions of conversations. After an investigation, WSPF concluded that there is strong circumstantial evidence that at least some of the lengthy deletions were deliberate, but no prosecution was possible for reasons outlined in the Report. The Report also describes the work of WSPF's "Dirty Tricks" task force. The "Dirty Tricks" investigation, which resulted in convictions of Donald Segretti and Dwight Chapin, sprung from reports that President Nixon's re-election cam- paign had included an undercover network of agents who had engaged in various kinds of political espionage and sabotage against candidates for the Democratic Presidential nimination. The reported activities included forging letters and other literature which unfairly attacked some candidates, planting manufactured stories in the press, copying documents from campaign files, and recruiting people to ask embarrassing questions at candidates' rallies or to picket such rallies on behalf of opposing candidates. WSPF also received and investigated allegations about possible "dirty tricks" by agents of Democratic candidates directed against President Nixon's campaign. ■ • 1 12 - WSPF's ITT task force investigated allegations that the Department of Justice had settled three antitrust suits in 1971 against International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation (ITT), one of the Nation's largest conglomerates, in return for ITT's alleged offer to help finance the 1972 Republican National Convention. These investigations included the possibility that perjury had been committed in the 1972 confirmation hearings of Richard Kleindienst to become Attorney General and an allegation that a Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) inquiry had been obstructed by ITT’s failure to produce certain documents. The Report summarizes these investigations and additional allegations that the Kleindienst hearings had been illegally obstructed; that crimes had been committed in connection with the transfer of documents relating to ITT from the SEC to the Justice Department; that ITT had been granted a favorable tax ruling by the Internal Revenue Service as a result of improper influence or fraud; that improper influence had been applied to the Justice Department’s handling of the antitrust suits against ITT, apart from the 1971 settlement; that improper influence had been used in securing the agreement of another corporation to merge with ITT; and that perjury had been committed by various people before Congressional Committees, the SEC, and the grand jury. Richard Kleindienst and Howard Reinecke were convicted by this Task Force. u" -r ■/ ;*V - - The "Plumbers" task force investigated and prosecuted those responsible for a break-in in September 1971 at the Los Angeles offices of Dr. Lewis Fielding, conducted to secure the psychiatric records of Fielding's former patient, Daniel Ellsberg. At the time of the break-in, Ellsberg was under indictment for his role in the alleged theft of the classified "Pentagon Papers." The report recounts that prosecution, which resulted in the conviction of six individuals; and a number of other investigations undertaken by WSPF's "Plumbers." These included investigations of other break-ins, a "national security" wiretap program, the alleged misuse of federal agencies, the alleged mistreatment of demonstrators, and an inquiry into President Nixon's tax returns. The Report also details the work of the Campaign Contri- 1 ^ 4 ^ A n 1 r ^ A ^ a a * 4 A * *T « ^ a m *-v 4 1 T • « «r m « 4 m a ^ In a ^ s a -4 m w uutiuiio uaorv iuivc, wiij-^h ojf o cAamjuicu uuc finances of major 1972 Republican and Democratic Presidential candidates. This examination included the investigation of several hundred separate transactions, including corporate and labor union contributions, recipients' non-reporting of contributions and expenditures, and alleged quid pro quo relationships between contributions and Government actions. xne Report speciricany aescriDes invest igacions into cne alleged sales of Ambassadorships, contributions made by Associated Milk Producers, Inc., the "Townhouse" program, the Hughes-Rebozo allegations and an inquiry into the National TY - ^ * nxspcuixu r jLuctiuje uumuiiLLet; T— ~ ~ 1 XU LUUi, ■*— Vv n Z * 1 rt tvirv •» P +■ *4 Ki 4 . UlC uauipax^u vswuuj. xuu tions Task Force convicted 32 individuals and 19 corporations. Chapter 3 concludes with a summary of the work of WSPF’s legal issues task force, the Office of Counsel to the Special Prosecutor. Efforts to Obtain Evidence from the White House (Chap. 4, first section) From the first days of Special Prosecutor Cox's tenure until many months after President Nixon's resignation, much of WSPF's energy and concern was devoted to a continuing struggle with the White House to obtain tapes, papers and other evidence that were under President Nixon's control during his incum- bency. The Report describes Cox's early efforts in May and June, 1973, to obtain papers and to insure that White House files con- m -w taining items he might need would not be tampered with. It - details the decision to seek tapes after their existence be- , came known in July, 1973, including the process of identifying for a subpoena the particular tapes which would establish whether John Dean or the President were telling the truth about the President's knowledge and involvement. The negotiations between Cox and the White House and litigation over the grand jury's subpoena which led in October 1973 to Cox's dismissal r are also described. The public uproar over Cox's firing led the President to agree to comply with the subpoena, and the Report describes the disclosure that two of the tapes were missing and one had an 18 1/2 minute gap and the resulting investiga- tion. It details Special Prosecutor Jawor ski's continuing efforts to obtain additional materials and the issuance in April 1974 of a subpoena for 64 tapes needed for the Watergate trial and the ensuing litigation resulting in the United States Supreme Court's unanimous decision on July 24, 1974, requiring that these tapes be turned over to the Special Prosecutor. After President Nixon's resignation WSPF took immediate action to prevent tapes and documents from the White House from being shipped to California and there ensued complex negotiations and litigation, described in the Report, resulting in the Special Prosecutor's obtaining access to the materials he believed he needed to complete his task. Actions Related to President Nixon's Possible Criminal Liability (Chap~! second section) Section B of Chapter 4 describes the issues facing the Special Prosecutor relating to the possible criminal liability of President Nixon. The background is John Dean's testimony in June, 1973 before the Senate Select Committee implicating the President in discussions of executive clemency for Water- gate burglar E. Howard Hunt and the decision to pay Hunt "hush money." Dean’s version was corroborated and added to oy . v . i. i niio i __i Li _ t_ i.Tnnrt J *1 1 j CCie narcn 41 , Ly{3 tape wijlcli worr uutauieu lui^wing tin "Saturday night massacre" in late October 1973. The Report describes the deliberations of WSPF on whether President Nixon could and should be indicted and Special Prosecutor Jawor ski's decision not to recommend such an indict' ment to the grand jury, but instead to transmit evidence pertinent to the President's involvement to the House Judiciary Committee which was then considering impeachment. The Report - details the steps leading to this information reaching the TJT A A r' AMM S 4—4— A n w% J J A n A V 4 h A *"4 ■#— V. /S A AS A 1* A *■ 4 A^ Vl A f*V.T A A Vl A nuusc ijuumiiLLce emu ucbCi lues uic uwupci ci u -lvh uclwccu uic Committee and WSPF that resulted in additional information and assistance being made available to the House Committee. On July 29, 1974 the Committee included in Article II of its Articles of Impeachment a charge that the President had "know- ingly misused the executive power by interfering with agencies of the federal government," and included WSPF among the agencies listed. The Report also details the decision to name President M 4 11 AAV LI A M -4 4 i V% /4 4 A 4 — A J CL Li UUJ.UUXULCU uu UUliapJLid. UUi J 1a a T.7 a J-* .fcA A* Aa . j-ii LUC vycl^is Lgau 1 A w« J 4 A 4-W4 a n XILUXUUUiClU.* S§ Si ' ... * '-r . '■"• ’ " — ' • ■' ' • "-VT-' ^i- ; - r.v, - SS^ |p fc ^“' . ^ •' ’t • t’ :, '* f '« " f / ’ ; J ' r'* •» ' J Al 1 >■• -t , -ij^' - -vT H f§ / : -. - ••*;••’ '.-" •••;•.>' •:'••••• ' ^". - v ,^yj \ i-Js., , V • . r -r : :*•?>; a' . • • ■■■'.. ■ V - 17 - . !.: ; ...•;-' ■ ' ' . •■-•■' . ' ‘ ' ' ' ■ ■' 4', • i^.- After President Nixon resigned. Special Prosecutor Jawprs^i^ 5 ^ c ^ided that he would defer any possible criminal action ■'•*■•■• » A*. » . CJ • : ' , .... f 1 ■ ■ 1 ; . -M*' ■ '■ 1 - ct ion : aga in st ■?£ ■ the former President until the Watergate cover-up jury was ,i :-■ ''v ■ / ^ : -.■. i W, J68&&: .'’ -^i sequestered and the trial had started. His purpose was to ^ \ . . . ... „ . . . ■ -. , .,*• if CJs avoid exposing the jurors to additional pre-trial publicity -V • '■■■ >5 .-;fy - , ''r>' The result of this decision was that Nixon, if charged with complicity in the Watergate cover-up, would have been trie« j i separately from Haldeman, Mitchell, Ehrlichman and the other alleged co-conspirators originally charged. The Report describes Jaworski’s meeting with Phil 1 ip • Buchen, Counsel to President Ford, in which the Special . ^ • --r'.Jk -■ ! -ft Prosecutor told Buchen that the pre-trial publicity required ® of at least 9 to 12 months before a jury could be selected and at which he gave Mr, Buchen a list of ten mat-' . .• '.r ters pending before WSPF which "may prove to have some connection to activities in which Mr. Nixon is personally involved, "but as to which WSPF lacked evidence of a probable! criminal violation. On September 8, President Ford pardoned Mr. Nixonf Oh t -r>: • ■ # ’iv Ife ■ -icy , ' s - i - ■ r-T. r * C" . October 12 Special Prosecutor Jaworski wrote Attorney Genera^ Saxbe a letter accompanying his resignation in which he ex- r ■ plained his reasons, included in the Report, for not challenging 1 ^ - L -.,. V .• T ^ the pardon. •rTr’W’i . V ! v -'l ; ^ 1 : ’JI.'VM r .jViV .^ v K ,1 >.?■ •/.'< V- • -Vt' v ..j y ■ ^ -.r- — , , , -! n I , I n I — * 18 t r o o In addition to the 154 pages in the main body of the Report summarized above, the Report included 13 appendices. They include a complete status report of all cases handled by WSPF up to September 15, 1975, a detailed organizational history of WSPF, a description of the relationship of the Special Prosecutor with the Attorney General and with various federal agencies and legislative committees, a detailed chronology of Watergate events as they related to WSPF’s work, and a comprehensive bibliography of the extensive public materials relating to matters investigated by WSPF.